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Can high self-control have drawbacks? Extensive research has shown the lifelong 
benefits of self-control for important outcomes such as education, health, income, and 
happiness. Far less work has been done on its potential negative impacts, where an 
overwhelmingly positive trait can end up having a less than positive effect on behavior. 
Recent research suggests that one such side effect may be an increased susceptibility to 
illusory control (IOC): in situations where actual control is limited but the potential for 
illusory control is high, high self-controllers may end up being more prone to 
overconfidence than low self-controllers, and this susceptibility may play out in 
suboptimal risk-taking behavior. Here, a series of five studies tests this causal chain, 
exploring the links between self-control and illusory control and the resulting impact of 
the relationship on risky decisions in the financial domain. 
 In studies 1 and 2, high self-controllers consistently underperformed low self-
controllers on two tasks of risk-taking, the Columbia Card Task and the Lottery 
Gambling Task. These effects persisted both under stress and in normal conditions. 
Individuals high in self-control failed to learn as well from negative feedback and were 
more prone to overconfidence, leading us to posit a causal mechanism rooted in the 
illusion of control, and specifically, in the positive affect that accompanies it. 
 Studies 3 through 5 proceeded to test this relationship directly, on a decision-
making task that looked specifically at financial risk-taking, the Behavioral Investment 
Allocation Strategy (BIAS). Across the three studies, we validated our findings from 
Studies 1 and 2 in the new risk-taking task, by showing that individuals low in self-
control consistently outperformed those in high self-control by making more optimal 
choices and fewer errors throughout the game.  
We next tested the precise causal mechanism of the observed decision making 
patterns by manipulating IOC (Study 3), positive affect (Study 4), and perceived self-
control (Study 5). We found that inducing IOC increased the number of errors committed 
by both high and low self-controllers across the board: individuals in the IOC condition 
made fewer optimal choices and performed worse overall, confirming our suspicion that 
IOC can be responsible for sub-optimal choices on financial risk-taking in stochastic 
environments. However, because the effect was non-selective, the precise causal 
mechanism and its relations to self-control still remained to be determined. 
In Studies 4 and 5, we were able to disambiguate the mechanism behind the 
underperformance caused by IOC. Specifically, we demonstrated that inducing positive 
affect (Study 4) reduced the number of optimal choices for low self-controllers on the 
BIAS task, making them look more like high self-controllers in their decisions. 
Surprisingly, the induction actually improved performance by high self-controllers. The 
perceived self-control induction (Study 5) also had a differential effect on high and low 
self-controllers. It decreased the number of optimal choices made by low self-controllers, 
again making them look more like high-self-controllers—but, just as with the positive 
affect induction, it increased the number of optimal choices made by high self-controllers. 
 The increase in positive affect that accompanied the self-control induction was a 
significant mediator of the effect, a mediation that held when we pooled data from all 
three studies into a single affective mediation analysis. 
The induction results for low self-controllers confirm our hypothesis that the 
positive affect that usually accompanies both the illusion of control and high self-control 
can be an Achilles heel of high self-control in certain environments with limited actual 
control, creating a feeling of overconfidence that translates into suboptimal decision 
making. We explain the surprising improvement in performance of high self-controllers 
under induction conditions, as compared to baseline, by the higher self-reflection ability 
that accompanies high self-control. Specifically, a situation that is normally “hot” for 
high self-controllers is cooled through an induction that draws their attention to their high 
baseline self-control and accompanying positive affect. As a result, they reflect on their 
choices to a greater extent and act more in line with their usual optimal decision making 
ability. 
We thus both identify a specific environment where high self-control can prove to 
be a limiting factor for optimal decision making, and suggest a possible way to remedy 
that limitation, by providing a cooling period and drawing the attention of high self-
controllers to the reasons for their sub-optimal strategy (namely, their positive feelings 
and high opinion of their own self-control). Together, the findings provide tantalizing 
implications for the sub-optimal market choices that even the most intelligent and 
successful individuals will make under the right conditions—and equally tantalizing ways 
to make those choices more sound.
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 “I’d be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were efficient,” quipped 
Warren Buffet in a 1995 interview with Fortune (Pare & McDonald, 1995). Booms and 
busts, bubbles and troughs, panics, depressions, recessions, and simple day-to-day 
extremes that sometimes make a stock fall to a fraction of its value in a matter of 
minutes: the erratic back-and-forth of the financial markets make one doubt whether the 
markets even begin to approach so-called efficient behavior—something that the great 
investors, including Buffett, are quick to grasp. But why is that the case? Why don’t 
markets move more efficiently—and how to you explain seemingly inefficient market 
behavior? What makes the same intelligent, motivated people who otherwise seem 
perfectly in control of their decisions turn suddenly irrational? What makes them make 
investment decisions that perpetuate the cycles of boom and bust that have plagued the 
financial markets for the last century?1 
When the stock market crashed in late 2007, a number of possible explanations 
was soon put forth: overconfidence; inevitable market cycles; the pursuit of profit at any 
cost, including unacceptable risk; greed, pure and simple. But what was the underlying 
cause of the behavioral changes observed in investors?  
Studies on intertemporal choice have shown that IQ, income, and education are all 
inversely related to discounting (Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 1996; de Wit, 
Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & Mauck, 2007; Kirby, Winston, & Santiesteban, 2005). 
And yet, when it comes to the markets, individuals high on some, if not all, of these 
measures—the investment professionals and investors most involved in the 2007-8 
crisis—repeatedly behave in a manner that seems more in line with the actions normally 
                                                
1 Even if we accept the argument that such cycles are an intrinsic part of natural market movement, few 
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associated with greater discounting and a lack of focus on future events. Increased 
discounting and impulsive behaviors are normally studied in relation to pathologies, such 
as ADHD, alcoholism and drug abuse, and pathological gambling, but in this instance, 
the best and the brightest followed those same behavioral patterns. What went wrong?  
One answer lies, paradoxically, in the very thing that makes these investors 
successful to begin with: high self-control ability. Could it be the case that a quality that 
is normally so beneficial could sometimes backfire, by making individuals more 
susceptible to the illusion of control, a perception of still being in control even when 
events have fallen outside your immediate power – as, say, in a casino—or a stock 
market? It is to the exploration of this possibility that we now turn. 
Theoretical background 
The benefits of self-control 
The ability to exert self-control is consistently—and almost universally—a 
positive life predictor. Centuries before any empirical evidence of its benefits would be 
observed, the Greeks were already singing its praises to the skies. Aristotle (2004) went 
as far as to include self-control in his list of moral (or ethical) virtues – the subject to 
which he devoted one of his most famous works, Nichomachean Ethics. 
Aristotle’s inclination to raise self-control on an ethical pedestal has, in more 
modern times, been proven consistently well-founded. The ability to exercise self-control 
has been tied repeatedly to positive outcomes over the entire life course, from general 
outcomes, such as income, education, health, and happiness (Mischel et al., 2011; Moffitt 
et al., 2011), to more localized outcomes, such as better performance under “hot” 
stimulus conditions (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). As adolescents, children who more 
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successfully delayed gratification on the original “marshmallow test” (Mischel, Ebbesen, 
& Zeiss, 1972) have better self-control and are generally more attentive, better able to 
concentrate, and better at tolerating frustration (Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Shoda, 
Mischel, & Peake, 1990). They also score better on measures of education, such as the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), and have better cognitive and social coping skills 
(Mischel et al., 1988; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Shoda et al., 1990). As adults, 
they have greater self-esteem, generally achieve better educational and economic 
outcomes, and are less likely to use drugs (Ayduk et al., 2000; Mischel et al., 2011). They 
are also more likely to have lower BMI (Schlam, Wilson, Shoda, Mischel, & Ayduk, 
2013), and to be conscientious, both directly and with respect to compliance with norms 
and academic motivation (Eisenberg, Duckworth, Spinrad, & Valiente, 2012).  
Children high in childhood delay ability are also more likely to develop 
spontaneous self-reflective, metacognitive monitoring strategies earlier and more 
effectively than those who are low in that ability (Mischel & Mischel, 1983). In other 
words, they are better able to reflect on their own cognition, learn from past behavior, and 
develop appropriate response strategies (such as “cooling” a hot stimulus, like a 
marshmallow, by putting it out of sight or reinterpreting it as a fluffy cloud). Such 
enhanced metacognition and self-reflection have, in turn, been shown to impact the 
ability of adults to learn from past errors (Keith & Frese, 2005), to reason more 
effectively, and to make better decisions (Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012). 
The positive effects of self-control extend to other populations, as well. Prisoners 
serving a prison sentence were less likely to re-offend within a 72-month period if they 
scored higher on several measures of self-control, even when other risk factors, such as 
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age of first offense and length of sentence, were taken into account (Grieger, Hosser, & 
Schmidt, 2011). Children high in self-control at age three were found to be over two 
times less likely to engage in disordered gambling at ages 21 and 32 than those who had 
scored low on self-control measures (Slutske, Moffitt, Poulton, & Caspi, 2012). 
In a longitudinal study (the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development 
Study) that followed 1,000 children from birth to the age of 32 and examined how their 
childhood self-control influenced later health, earnings, and likelihood to commit 
criminal offenses, Terrie Moffitt and colleagues discovered that early self-control ability 
predicted improved physical health and personal finances, as well as a lowered likelihood 
of substance dependence and criminal behavior (Moffitt et al., 2011). On the flip side, 
individuals with poor self-control were less able to plan financially for the future, had 
more money management problems and credit difficulties, were more likely to be 
convicted of a criminal offense, and were more likely to have problems with drugs or 
alcohol. These effects held irrespective of intelligence, social class, and mistakes made as 
adolescents (such as tobacco use, dropping out of school, or having a child).  
A number of individuals in the study, however, had managed to move up the self-
control gradient: they had overcome low childhood self-control, becoming more self-
controlled as they reached young adulthood. These individuals exhibited outcomes akin 
to those who had always been high in self-control, suggesting that this ability, whether 
self-taught or externally imposed, can have direct effects on positive life outcomes.  
For those unable to increase self-control, the outcome is not nearly as positive. 
The Moffitt group also looked at a sample of 500 sibling pairs from the Environmental-
Risk Longitudinal Twin Study, a study of British twins that had been tracked from birth 
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in 1994-5 to the present day. Within each pair, the sibling with lower self-control ability 
had poorer life outcomes into adolescence, despite having shared a substantially similar 
childhood and family background. Specifically, the twin who had lower self-control was 
more likely to begin smoking, perform poorly in school, and engage in antisocial 
behaviors. 
Recent brain imaging data suggests that the ability to delay gratification in favor 
of larger later rewards is tied to prefrontal regions, whereas the choice of immediate 
rewards is related to limbic, or emotional brain regions (Casey et al., 2011; McClure, 
Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; 
Sanfey, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011). Specifically, when 
it comes to the ability to delay an immediate response, the inferior frontal gyrus is 
involved in resolving interference among competing actions, such as whether to go or not 
go on a Go/No-go test of cognitive control (Casey, Tottenham, & Fossella, 2002; Aron, 
Roberts, & Poldrack, 2004).  
When 27 of the original participants in the marshmallow test of delay ability 
completed two delay tasks while in an fMRI scanner, the low delayers—those who had 
consistently exhibited lower self-control ability from early childhood—had diminished 
activity in the right prefrontal cortex, which has been implicated in response inhibition 
(Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 2011; Casey et al., 1997; Durston, Thomas, Worden, Yang, 
& Casey, 2002; Ochsner et al, 2004), and increased activity in the ventral striatum, an 
area that has been implicated in the processing of rewarding and positive cues 
(Somerville et al., 2011; Galvan et al., 2005; Delgado, Nystrom, Fissell, Noll, & Fiez, 
2000), as compared to the individuals with high delay ability (Casey et al., 2011). 
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Specifically, low delayers had diminished recruitment relative to high delayers of the 
right inferior frontal gyrus and increased recruitment of the ventral striatum. 
These results suggest that high self-control is related to the ability to deploy 
attention in a flexible manner, governed by the prefrontal circuitry, and to cool, or resist, 
emotionally hot stimuli—abilities that should have positive effects in myriad 
circumstances, when cognitive cooling and attentional control can make the difference 
between a choice that is optimal and one that is less so. 
 But could there be a negative side to self-control, as well? Could individuals 
generally high in self-control be more likely to fall prey to certain biases in their decision 
making, despite their otherwise positive attention and emotion regulation abilities, that 
could in turn cause them to make decisions less successfully under certain conditions 
than those lower in self-control? While we know that baseline self-control does not 
always equal high self-control in a given situation, as self-control can be depleted 
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) and can fluctuate depending on trigger conditions such as 
stress (Metcalfe & Jacobs, 1998), individuals high in self-control have, to our knowledge, 
never been shown to be more susceptible to performance-detracting phenomena than 
those low in self-control. 
Illusion of control, overconfidence, and self-control 
Self-control and the illusion of control are seen as, at best, scarcely related topics, 
and, at worst, opposite ends of a spectrum. For, whereas the former presupposes an active 
ability to control oneself and, in so doing, control to some extent one’s interaction with 
the environment, the latter is defined by a semblance of control where none actually 
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exists, or indeed is even possible. And yet, what if these two concepts were much more 
closely related than would seem to be the case? 
Originally defined by Langer as “an expectancy of a personal success probability 
inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” (Langer, 1975), 
illusory control (IOC) has since been implicated in a variety of behaviors where 
individuals feel inappropriately confident in either their skills or their ability to predict 
future outcomes given the circumstances. It has received attention in risky lottery 
investments (Charness & Gneezy, 2010), stock market behavior and financial decision 
making (Shefrin, 2000; Shiller, 2000), and portfolio diversification strategies (Fellner, 
2009). In financial markets, overconfidence has been tied to excess volatility, as stocks 
overreact to private information (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyan, 1998), and to 
poor performance. One study followed 107 traders in four London banks and found that 
those with the highest illusion of control performed the worst, as measured by managers’ 
ratings of performance and total renumeration (Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, & Willman, 
2003).  
Overconfidence is inherent in illusory control: if you perceive yourself to be in 
control when, in fact, you are not, your confidence in your ability relative to the 
environment will necessarily be mismatched. Thus, wherever there is illusory control, 
there is overconfidence—and overconfidence is often the main way in which the effects 
of illusory control are seen behaviorally. In one classic demonstration of the effect 
(Oskamp, 1965), clinical psychologists were asked to give confidence judgments on a 
personality profile. They were given a case report in four parts, based on an actual 
clinical case, and asked after each part to answer a series of questions about the patient’s 
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personality, such as his behavioral patterns, interests, and typical reactions to life events. 
They were also asked to rate their confidence in their responses. With each section, 
background information about the case increased. As the psychologists learned more, 
their confidence rose—but accuracy remained at a plateau. Indeed, all but two of the 
clinicians became overconfident, and while the mean level of confidence rose from 33 
percent at the first stage to 53 percent by the last, the accuracy hovered at under 28 
percent (where 20 percent was chance, given the question setup).  
In her exploration of illusory control, Langer (1975) found a similar effect of 
information on perceived control and attendant confidence. The more information 
individuals had about a pure chance lottery, the more confident they were in their ability 
to win—to the point where they actively refused a chance to trade their original ticket for 
one where the objective chances of winning were better. What’s more, when participants 
were given time to familiarize themselves with and practice on a task of pure luck, they 
rated their confidence in their ability to succeed in that task as significantly higher—even 
though the chance nature of the task had not changed in any way. 
While the literature on illusory control and overconfidence remains distinct from 
that on self-control, some of the same factors tied to the former have been identified as 
key correlates in the latter, suggesting a closer relationship than may at first appear to be 
the case. Overconfidence has been shown to increase with age, education, and knowledge 
(Bhandari & Deaves, 2006)—three elements that are also associated with high self-
control (Mischel et al., 2011). Overconfidence also increases as a function of past success 
and expertise (Billett & Qian, 2008; Maciejovsky & Kirchler, 2011), again, two elements 
often associated with high self-control (as high self-controllers tend to experience greater 
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success in employment and educational outcomes) (Mischel et al., 2011; Moffitt et al., 
2011). In one real world example of that dynamic, financial analysts who were more 
accurate at predicting earnings in the previous four quarters were found to be less 
accurate in subsequent predictions—without suffering a concomitant loss in confidence 
(Hilary & Menzly, 2006). As individuals high in self-control normally are highly 
successful in their life choices, does it not stand to reason that they may be prone to 
acquiring some of those same biases and predilections? Overconfidence has also been 
shown to increase with power: the more powerful someone feels, the more 
overconfident—and the poorer in quality—his decisions (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & 
Galinsky, 2012). Since high self-controllers tend to be more successful in their career 
outcomes, it is likely that they are more often in positions of power—and hence, more 
susceptible to some of these same effects. 
Given the chance for honesty, most of us find that, when it comes right down to it, 
we’re above-average in just about everything we do, whether it be driving (Svenson, 
1981) or performing successfully in our professional lives (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). 
We also tend to believe that we have above-average chances of attaining positive life 
outcomes—and below-average chances of chancing upon negative ones (Weinstein, 
1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988). But while that perceptual fallacy is usually just that, a 
fallacy—given symmetrical distributions, only half of the population can be above-
average on any given trait or ability, and perceived probabilities of events are usually far 
removed from actual probabilities (and certainly aren’t related to the positivity or 
negativity of the outcome in question)—individuals who are high in self-control normally 
really are above-average in most things, and do have above-average chances of reaching 
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better life outcomes – and not experiencing some of the more unpleasant possibilities, 
especially as they relate to earnings and health. Little wonder that they would be more 
likely victims of the illusion of control. 
While little experimental work has been done to determine whether individuals 
who are higher in actual self-control may also be more likely to fall prey to the illusion of 
control, such a possibility is not only theoretically justified, but may well shed light on 
the mechanisms of illusion of control biases, as well as provide a causal mechanism for 
observed poor performance by high self-controllers in financial risk-taking tasks. 
Specifically, we posit the following scenario: in situations where the potential for 
illusory control is high (i.e., the conditions are most conducive for its development) and 
actual control is limited, individuals who are normally high in self-control may be more 
prone to overconfidence and resulting errors in judgment and decision making. Such 
situations are most likely to arise in environments where (Langer, 1975; Kahneman, 
1998):  
(1) an individual is actively involved as opposed to being a passive observer;  
(2) there is an opportunity for choice;  
(3) the outcome sequence seems favorable (i.e., people think they are doing well 
at the start; one example is the famous hot hand fallacy);  
(4) there is an extent of familiarity (i.e., the environment or task is a relatively 
comfortable one) 
(5) information is available; 
(6) past success has been achieved; and 
(7) there is a lack of predictability  
  
11 
Just such an environment is found in the stock market. 
Stock markets, emotion, and irrationality: A hotbed of overconfidence 
John Maynard Keynes, one of the most influential economists of the twentieth 
century, believed that the markets he studied were far removed from rational behavior. 
Instead, he argued, many of the decisions that drove markets one way or the other were 
the result of little more than a so-called animal spirit. “Most, probably, of our decisions to 
do something positive,” he wrote, “the full consequences of which will be drawn out over 
many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits of a spontaneous 
urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of 
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities” (Keynes, 1936, Chapter 12, 
Section VII). People making weighty financial decisions weren’t being nearly as weighty, 
as it were, as they thought. Instead, more often then not, they were making choices based 
on little more than a “spontaneous urge.” 
While Keynes’s view remains a controversial one—on the flipside, we have the 
proponents of Efficient Markets Theory, who argue that markets are driven by rational 
expectations and that people will act upon the same information in much the same way 
given the same circumstances—it has been widely adopted by the school of behavioral 
economics – and by highly successful investors like Warren Buffett. Behavioral 
economists agree in large part with that idea of the guiding animal spirit: while some 
rational appraisals are indeed possible, the market’s inherent uncertainty and riskiness 
makes it a prime environment for emotional decision making and risk-taking decisions 
that are driven by something other than pure rationality.  
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What kind of an effect would that have on decision making? In their classic 
treatment of decision making under risk, Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) argue that, while people are more sensitive to losses than gains in general, they are 
risk seeking in long-shot and near-certain loss situations and risk averse in choices 
involving certain gains. They are also highly susceptible to the framing effects of gains 
and losses and will exhibit inconsistent preferences with different choice presentations. In 
situations of stress, such as those marked by high uncertainty and risk, these effects tend 
to be exacerbated (e.g., Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Kahneman has since gone on to argue 
that nowhere is the exacerbation—as well as the role of additional biases that he and 
Tversky went on to identify over decades of research—more extreme or pronounced than 
in investor decision making (Kahneman, 1998). 
Financial decisions, Kahneman argues, are made in an environment that is 
inherently complex and high on uncertainty. As such, it precludes the reliance of decision 
makers on fixed rules, and pushes them instead to go by first-gut responses and intuition. 
Among the biases that are most likely to affect subsequent investment decisions, 
overconfidence tops the list. The reason is simple: stock markets are complicated, they 
are uncertain, they are risky, and they are random. And yet, just as these characteristics 
should make investors more cautious, they instead open them up to the possibility of 
interpreting events as they see fit.  
We know that, when it comes to agency, randomness is more often perceived as 
the result of free choice than more deterministic actions (Ebert & Wegner, 2011) and that 
people are very quick to see a casual regularity in a series of events that is actually 
random (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). Just as in basketball, fans of the game are 
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certain that professional players are sometimes “hot” and sometimes “cold” relative to 
their overall average, even though in reality, there are no more deviations from long-term 
percentages than are expected by chance (the “hot hand” fallacy), so in finance, certain 
fund managers or traders or even inanimate stocks are seen as behaving in better or worse 
streaks. A random set of market outcomes is thus interpreted as causal when it is in fact 
no such thing—a misperception of illusory control and false meaning that quickly results 
in overconfidence and decreased trading performance (Odean, 1999). And while we 
might expect investors to learn from their mistakes and act more in keeping with rational 
expectations in the future, we see no such thing. Instead, the exact same forces that made 
them more prone to overconfidence and an excess sense of control to begin with lead 
them to hindsight bias, a perception of the past whereby even unanticipated events are 
explained as inevitable (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Biais & Weber, 2009; 
Gärling, Kirchler, Lewis, & Raaij,  2009; Kahneman & Riepe, 1998). 
The result? Kahneman writes, “The combination of overconfidence and optimism 
is a potent brew, which causes people to overestimate their knowledge, underestimate 
risks, and exaggerate their ability to control events. It also leaves them vulnerable to 
statistical surprises” (1998). 
If individuals high in self-control are also more likely to fall prey to illusory 
control, a stock-market-like environment—and certainly one with high risk and 
uncertainty—seems like the ideal set of circumstances in which that relationship would 
come to the forefront. 
The current research 
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In my dissertation, I propose to test the relationship between illusory control and 
self-control and the effects of that relationship on overconfidence and subsequent choice 
by examining behavior on a series of risky decision tasks that have the elements 
necessary for illusory control to develop. I suggest that individuals high in self-control 
may systematically underperform relative to low self-controllers in stochastic 
environments, such as the stock market, where actual control is low, and that the 
relationship is mainly driven by an affective mechanism: namely, that because high self-
controllers are generally in control and happier, they may fail to moderate their behavior 
as necessary in situations where actual control is limited. 
On the one hand, given the impressive value demonstrated for self-control in 
many domains, one might assume that high self-controllers would also make more 
appropriate decisions on financial risk-taking tasks. Self-control and the ability to delay 
gratification should make it easier to stay “cool” and rational under conditions of stress 
and frustration (Mischel et al., 1989; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). On the other hand, the 
life-long success experiences of high self-controllers may result in greater confidence in 
their decision-making ability and their ability to control personal outcomes, leading to 
greater illusory control. Hence, it may lead to risk-taking behavior that does not 
sufficiently incorporate negative external environmental cues, resulting in worse 
performance under conditions where such incorporation would be helpful to performance.  
Here, I focus specifically on the possibility that decision-makers high in self-
control might be more likely to succumb to overconfidence and illusory control, and that 
these biases may in turn affect risk-taking behavior. To test this possibility, I present a 
series of five studies that will strive to address the relationship between self-control and 
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the illusion of control—and explore how that relationship in turn affects risky financial 
decision making, specifically in stock-market-like environments. The first two studies are 
correlational in nature, exploring the connection between self-control, illusory control, 
overconfidence, and non-value-optimizing decisions on two games of risky decision 
making, the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; 
Figner & Weber, in press) and the Lottery Gambling Task (LGT; Gneezy & Potters, 
1997). The subsequent three studies are designed to experimentally manipulate the 
observed relationship, to show a more causal link between self-control, susceptibility to 
illusory control, overconfidence, and resulting risk-taking decisions, specifically through 
manipulating the illusion of control (Study 3), positive affect (Study 4), and perceived 
self-control (Study 5), in a stock picking task, the Behavioral Investment Allocation 
Strategy (BIAS; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), that is more germane to our environment and 
behavior of interest. These studies are also aimed to further elucidate the exact 
mechanism of action for the observed effects. 
 At the end of the series of experiments, I hope to demonstrate the following: 
(1) High self-control creates above-average susceptibility to illusory control and 
overconfidence in situations where actual control is limited. 
(2) This susceptibility, in turn, manifests itself in sub-optimal choices on tasks of 
risky financial decision making. 
(3) The main driver of the observed effects is affective. Namely, individuals high in 
self-control have higher positive affect, which leads to lowered sensitivity to 
specific task demands and feedback. 
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(4) If individuals low in self-control are artificially induced to look more like 
individuals high in self-control, through illusory control, positive affect, or self-
control inductions, they, too, will start making fewer optimal choices. 
(5) Affect inductions will have the strongest effect, suggesting affect as the main 
driver of the behavioral differences between low and high self-controllers. 
(6) When high self-controllers become aware of their positive affect or self-
perceptions, they will improve their performance and begin to look more like low 
self-controllers, as they are generally superior decision makers. 
In exploring these claims, I hope to shed light on the oft-observed irrationality of 
otherwise highly intelligent and successful market actors and provide means by which 






Why is it that, when it comes to the stock market, perfectly rational and highly 
intelligent individuals sometimes make less than ideal choices, choices that in retrospect 
seem to belie their intellect and usual control ability? Prompted by the 2007-2008 stock 
market crash, we decided to examine this question through the lens of self-control ability 
and stress. Could the crisis have been exacerbated by some bad choices made by decision 
makers as a function of their self-control? 
Since the manipulation of stress in financial-market decisions was not feasible in 
a field setting, we used an online study to assess vulnerability to illusory control and 
overconfidence and compare performance of high and low self-controllers on two 
financial risk-taking tasks—the Columbia Card Task (CCT) (Figner, Mackinlay, 
Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; Figner & Weber, in press) and the Lottery Gambling Task 
(LGT) (Gneezy & Potters, 1997)—in a non-stress condition versus a stress condition that 
used a time-pressure manipulation (to simulate the time pressures experienced by 
individuals involved in real-world stock trades, where moment-by-moment price 
fluctuations are often an important element of business success). The CCT measures 
dynamic risk-taking, with degree of risk increasing over the course of a trial; relatively 
conservative risk-taking is optimal, as participants face large losses and relatively smaller 
gains. The LGT measures static risk-taking, as the probability of winning and losing 
remains constant; optimal behavior is risk-seeking, as the expected value (EV) of the 
risky investment option is positive. The two tasks were chosen specifically for the flipped 
                                                
2 Results of Studies 1 and 2 were submitted for review as “Can self-control backfire? Illusory control, 
stress, and financial risk taking.” Konnikova, M., Figner, B., Mischel, W., and Weber, E.U. 
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risk, to disambiguate behavioral adjustment from general risk-taking propensities from 
the onset. 
We measured self-control both behaviorally (using a Go/No-Go task, where 
subjects must respond to target stimuli but suppress responses to non-target stimuli) and 
by self-report (using the Barratt Impulsivity Scale, BIS-11) (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 
1995). Go/No-Go performance predicts delay of gratification in a longitudinal study of 
children (Eigsti et al., 2006) and lifetime self-control levels (Mischel et al., 2011; Casey 
et al., 2011), and there is evidence that performance on both the Delay of Gratification 
paradigm and the Go/No-Go recruits similar biological and neural systems (Casey et al., 
2011; Mischel & Ayduk, 2004). The BIS-11 is also associated with lifetime self-control 
(Mischel et al., 2011). 
We initially expected that high self-controllers would have better metacognitive 
understanding of the overall strategy for each task and that their performance would be 
less affected by stress than that of low self-controllers. Consequently, we expected that 
they would perform better overall on the CCT and the LGT in both the no-stress and 
stress conditions. We predicted that they would better judge optimal risk, thus employing 
a better strategy, and consequently, end up with better financial outcomes than low self-
controllers.  
Instead, we found that high self-controllers failed to adjust behavior as a function 
of situational information, especially under stress, on the two tasks. We show that the 
explanation for this surprising result lies in illusory control and the accompanying 
overconfidence in one’s chosen actions: high self-controllers, in an environment where 
uncertainty and chance play a role, felt more in control (and hence, more confident and 
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less anxious) than warranted, and consequently, failed to react to external feedback and 
modify their behavior when such modification was needed, remaining confident in their 
initial choice of strategy. In contrast, low self-controllers were more likely to react to 
environmental cues, namely stress, changes in loss information on the CCT, and feedback 




 141 participants (102 male, 39 female; mean age = 29 years, SD = 4.64) from a 
national online panel maintained by the Center for Decision Sciences at Columbia 
University participated in this study,3 after providing informed consent. Participants 
received a minimum of $4, but could earn up to $24, depending on their choices. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Go/No-Go Paradigm. A Go/No-Go task (2 blocks of 140 trials each) paid money 
for correct and fast “go” responses (button press in response to target letter “X” appearing 
on the screen) and subtracted money for incorrect responses (button press in response to 
non-target letter “K” appearing on the screen). Go (X) and No-Go (K) stimuli were 
presented in unpredictable sequences, each for 500ms, with Go stimuli being much more 
frequent than No-Go stimuli (each Go stimulus was preceded by 1 to 7 No-Go stimuli). 
Stimuli were separated by an interstimulus interval (fixation cross) of 500ms. Participants 
completed this task twice: once at the start of the experiment, and once near the end, 
before demographic and debriefing questions.  
                                                
3 The sample skewed younger and male to represent financial industry demographics. No gender 
differences were found in this initial sample. 
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After the first Go/No-Go task, participants were randomly assigned to a no-stress 
or stress condition of the CCT and the LGT (described below). Stress and no-stress 
conditions were identical except for a time-pressure manipulation (a timer that counted 
down in seconds and milliseconds and turned from green to red at the halfway mark) for 
task responses in the stress condition.  
The Columbia Card Task (CCT).  We used an incentive-compatible 24-round 
version of the computer-administered CCT (Figner et al., 2009; Figner & Weber, in 
press). Each round presented participants with 32 facedown cards, arranged in four rows 
of eight cards. The display indicated how many cards were loss cards (“probability”) and 
how much was gained or lost for each gain or loss card (“gain amount” and “loss 
amount”). Participants could turn over cards either until they decided to stop and collect 
gains for the round, or until they encountered a loss card, at which point the round ended 
and the loss amount was subtracted from the score of the current round. In the stress 
condition, participants had 18 seconds to complete each round, and failing to complete 
the round in that time resulted in the round’s end and a score of zero.4  
A full factorial within-subject design varied probability (1 or 3 loss cards), gain 
amount (10 or 30 points), and loss amount (250 or 750 points). Each combination of 
factor levels was presented three times, for 24 independent trials, randomly ordered 
within each block. All feedback was unrigged and three randomly chosen trials were later 
paid out in real money. 
The Lottery Gambling Task (LGT). The Lottery Gambling Task (Gneezy & 
Potters, 1997) had nine identical but independent rounds of an incentive-compatible two-
part choice. For each of the rounds, participants received $1 and had to decide how much, 
                                                
4 This situation did not occur. Results were not affected. 
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from nothing to the full dollar, to bet in a lottery that had a 2/3 probability of losing the 
amount bet and a 1/3 probability of winning 2.5 times the amount bet. For all rounds, the 
EV of betting was positive. In the stress condition, participants had eight seconds to 
complete each round. Failure to place a bet in that time resulted in a default bet of zero 
and advancement to the next round. 
Each participant completed both the CCT and LGT, in counterbalanced order.5 A 
stress manipulation check and questions regarding the experience of playing the game 
followed each task. Participants also completed the BIS-11, the PANAS (Watson et al., 
1988), and standard demographic questions.  
Results 
Self-control measure   
To measure self-control, we created a composite score of average commission 
errors on both administrations of the Go/No-Go task and scores on the BIS-11 self-
control subscale. To arrive at the score, all measures were first standardized, then 
averaged. Average number of commission errors in the Go/No-Go tasks correlated with 
the BIS-11 at r = .32 (p < .001). Commission errors on the two administrations of the 
Go/No-Go correlated at r = .7 (p < .001). 
As high self-controllers tend to earn more over their lifetime (Mischel et al., 2011; 
Moffitt et al., 2011), we examined reported income and found that greater self-control 
was in fact associated with higher incomes, r = .25 (p = .003) in our sample. 
                                                
5 No order effects were found. 
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Participants were divided into high and low self-controllers by a median split6 on 
the composite score. 
Perception of stress 
Stress manipulation checks examined participants’ self-reported stress levels 
following each risk-taking task, as well as the stress items from the PANAS.7  We 
combined these two measures into a stress perception score that ranged from one to nine. 
Stress perception was significantly higher in the stress than the no-stress condition 
(F(1,141) = 4.21, p = .04). Participants low in self-control perceived greater stress in both 
conditions than did high self-controllers (condition, F(1,141) = 4.7, p =.03), and greater 
perceived stress was, in turn, associated with decreased risk-taking on both the CCT, 
r(140) = -.61, p = < .001, and the LGT, r(141) = -.18, p = .03.  
Illusion of control 
 To explain the initially surprising result that better self-control was not 
accompanied by better risk-taking strategy in either the LGT or the CCT (described in 
detail below), we examined whether high self-controllers felt more in control, both in 
general and under stress, and thus failed to adjust their risk strategy to external cues.  
 To determine whether illusory control was responsible for our behavioral results, 
we examined participants’ answers to the questions of whether they felt that their success 
was a result of skill (rather than luck) and whether their strategy was the result of analysis 
(rather than intuition or gut-feeling). As shown in Figure 1(a), high self-controllers 
believed more that their success was the result of skill, t(138) = 2.42, p = .02, that they 
                                                
6 A median split was used instead of a continuous measure in keeping with the traditional presentation of 
self-control findings. Results remain essentially unchanged with self-control as a continuous variable. 
7 The “distressed” item correlated with the other stress items as follows: upset r = .52 (p < .001); nervous r 
= .47 (p < .001); jittery r = .76 (p < .001); and afraid r = .51 (p < .001). 
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reached their solution by a mathematical approach, t(138) = 2.54, p = .01, and through 
careful thinking, t(138) =  2.88, p = .005, and that they used all available information in 
each trial, t(138) = 3.03, p = .003, all suggesting that high self-controllers, compared to 
low self-controllers, perceived their decisions to be based more strongly on skill and 
analysis. Their self-assessment of performance thus was consistent with a perception of 
being in control of one’s outcomes. 
 Consistent with an enhanced perception of their performance as a result of 
overconfidence, high self-controllers (more than low) reported focusing on the gain 
amount on each CCT trial, t(138) = 2.26, p = .03, and thought they did better compared to 
others, t(138) = 2.34, p = .02, and were in general lucky at games of chance, t(138) = 2.18, 
p = .03, a finding that is especially congruent with illusory control, as, by definition, it is 
impossible to perform better than others at games of chance. At an emotional level, 
shown by the PANAS scores in Figure 1(b), high self-controllers felt less upset, t(132) = 
-2.09 (p < .001), nervous t(134) = -2.55 (p < .001), and afraid, t(137) = -2.43 (p = .004) 
than low self-controllers. Conversely, they reported feeling stronger t(137) = 2.67 (p 
= .03), more excited t(137) = 3.76 (p = .02), more determined t(126) = 3.29 (p < .001), 
and more active t(124) = 3.53 (p < .001). These reported emotional states often 
accompany a high sense of control (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Alloy & Abramson, 1982; 
Bandura & Cervone, 1983), and would be expected to drive behavior consistent with 
feeling in control. 
Risk-taking 
Lottery Gambling Task (LGT). Risk-taking on the LGT was assessed by 
average bet size, with larger bets indicating greater risk-taking. Optimal strategy, based 
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on maximizing EV,8 would be betting the maximum possible amount, or $1.00, on all 
trials. An ANOVA with stress and self-control as predictors and average bet size as the 
dependent variable found that high self-controllers took significantly less risk than low 
self-controllers (F(1,141) = 8.79, p = .004). As shown in Figure 2(a), they bet on average 
$0.45 in the no-stress condition and $0.48 under stress, as compared to bets of $0.62 and 
$0.58, respectively, by low self-controllers.  
Columbia Card Task (CCT). Risk-taking on the CCT was assessed by the 
average number of cards turned over across rounds, with a higher number of cards 
indicating greater risk-taking. An ANOVA with stress and self-control as predictors and 
average number of cards turned over as the dependent variable found that both high and 
low self-controllers took less risk in the stress condition than in the no-stress condition, as 
shown in Figure 3, though the overall difference did not reach significance (F(1,141) = 
2.58; p = .11). On this task, unlike on the LGT, high self-controllers took more risk than 
low self-controllers in both conditions (F(1,141) = 7.25, p = .008). Just like on the LGT, 
however, they adjusted their risk-taking less than low self-controllers as a function of 
situational influences, taking on average 0.86 fewer cards in the stress compared to the 
no-stress condition, in contrast with the 1.16 fewer cards taken by low self-controllers, 
though the difference was only a trend and not significant. 
Unlike the LGT, the CCT varies by round in the information provided 
(probability, gain amount, and loss amount). We were therefore also able to see whether 
any of these external cues were driving differences in risk-taking. Individual-subject 
regressions of risk taking across rounds provided regression coefficients (betas) for the 
                                                
8 Our results do not change in pattern if we assume instead that people show typical levels of risk aversion, 
rather than assuming them to be risk neutral. 
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effects of probability, gain amount, and loss amount on risk-taking for each participant. A 
separate ANOVA for each beta examined the effects of stress condition and self-control 
level on these betas. The only significant difference between low and high self-
controllers was in sensitivity to loss amounts (F(1, 141) = 14.64, p < .001). Low self-
controllers adjusted their strategy more than high self-controllers when faced with larger 
losses. High self-controllers in our task largely ignored loss information. This finding is 
consistent with less anxiety and more confidence among high self-controllers, consistent 
with high self-controllers experiencing larger illusion of control effects. 
Mediation 
A mediation analysis using multiple mediation bootstrapping (Shrout & Bolger, 
2002) examined whether anxiety and/or confidence (aggregated from participant PANAS 
scores)9 mediated the relationship between self-control and risk-taking on the CCT.10 
Simultaneously adding the two factors decreased the effect of self-control from B = 1.54 
(p = .01) to B = .43 (p = .44), indicating significant partial mediation (R2=.37; F(3,137) = 
26.41; p < .0001). As shown in Figure 4, higher self-control was associated with 
decreased anxiety (-.55, p = .02), and lower anxiety increased risk-taking (-1.6, p 
< .0001). While higher self-control was associated with increased confidence (.64, p 
<.001), the effect of confidence on risk-taking was not significant, suggesting that it is the 
absence of anxiety in high self-controllers that drives their increased risk taking, a finding 
consistent with high self-controllers’ perceived control and lower reports of feeling 
stressed. 
                                                
9 “Anxiety” incorporates the nervous, upset, and afraid items on the PANAS; “confidence” incorporates the 
proud, enthusiastic, excited, and interested items. 
10 For the LGT, we found only weak evidence for mediation, as the direct effect of self-control on risk-
taking remained significant and was only marginally reduced (from B = -.14 (p = .002) to B = -.13 (p = 




Though high self-control is usually highly beneficial, Study 1 identified decision-
making situations in which it may actually be seriously disadvantageous. A generalized 
expectation of control, particularly when unwarranted by circumstances, may lead to 
selective misreading of information and failure to align risk-taking strategy with local 
circumstances. Higher self-control can thus increase the likelihood that illusory control, 
and its emotional correlates, such as low anxiety and high confidence, will encourage 
non-optimal risk-taking.  
We found that high self-controllers perceive less stress than low self-controllers, 
in both non-stress and stress conditions. Perceived stress decreases risk-taking in both the 
CCT and the LGT, as one would expect if decision makers misattributed their feeling of 
stress to the choice task (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983). Consistent with such an effect, we found that overall, low self-controllers play 
closer to optimal strategy in the CCT, while high self-controllers consistently take more 
risk than prudent. And, while high self-controllers minimally adjust their risk-taking 
downward under stress, they do not do so enough to improve performance and not as 
much as those with low self-control. Similarly, although with a flipped risk pattern, high 
self-controllers consistently take less risk than advisable in the LGT, while low self-
controllers take greater risks and are again closer to optimal strategy.  
What would explain this pattern of results? Unpacking the drivers of risk-taking 
showed greater incorporation of negative information, like stress or losses, into risk-
taking decisions by low self-controllers than high self-controllers. Low self-controllers, 
unlike high, react to large potential losses on the CCT by adjusting their risk downward. 
  
27 
While both groups take more risk after experiencing a loss in both the CCT and the LGT, 
low self-controllers do so more in both games. In contrast, high self-controllers, unlike 
low, gradually increase risk-taking in the LGT after winning. This reaction to a chance 
outcome suggests they feel more likely to win on subsequent rounds as a result and 
indicates greater susceptibility to illusory control. 
Thus, low self-controllers seem more sensitive to external factors, while high self-
controllers appear to disregard feedback that runs counter to their sense of situational 
control. We find further evidence for the presence of illusory control from self-reports, 
where high self-controllers perceive their decisions as resulting from skill and thought, 
perceive themselves as generally lucky in chance situations, perceive their results as 
better than others’, and report low anxiety and high confidence. Actual risky choices are 
consistent with those beliefs: increasing risk after initial wins on the LGT suggests that a 
win could confirm the “I am lucky” bias, while ignoring negative information and stress 
and not adjusting strategy accordingly in either game confirms that disconfirming 
elements are not incorporated into risk-taking decisions. 
These findings have intriguing implications for understanding some of the 
dynamics that might have played a role in real world financial crises like the 2008 market 
crash.  Plausibly, high self-controllers continued to take too much risk for too long, 
perceiving themselves to be more in control than warranted and misreading data based on 
this illusory control, preferentially focusing on the positive. Such dynamics might have 
contributed to both the formation of the pre-crash bubble and failure to read the warning 
signs of the crash.  
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However, Study 1 provides only correlation evidence, on an artificially skewed 
sample, with limited measures of illusory control. We thus proceed to Study 2, where we 
run the study on a broader sample and include additional measures of IOC and 








Study 2 was run to determine if the self-control and illusion of control effects 
observed in Study 1 would generalize across age and gender, to observe in greater detail 
the specific impact of the two emotional correlates of the illusion of control, namely, 
absence of anxiety and presence of confidence (or overconfidence, as the case may be), 
and to explore possible repercussions for actual financial behavior. It also included new 
measures to assess perceived control and confidence. 
We replicated the effects observed in Study 1 across gender and age, further 
validated the measure of self-control with real-world financial outcomes, and 
demonstrated the connection between self-control and IOC with additional self-report 
measures and measures of real-world financial behavior. 
Method 
Participants 
185 participants (75 male; 110 female; mean age = 38.83 years, SD = 15.61) 
participated in the study, after providing informed consent. All participants were from a 
national online panel maintained by the Center for Decision Sciences at Columbia 
University. 
Materials and Procedures 
 The procedure in Study 2 was identical to Study 1, with the exception of 
additional measures of confidence, sense of control, and real-world financial behavior. In 
Study 1, our measure of illusory control and overconfidence was confined to self-report 
statements, such as “I am generally lucky in games of chance,” and relevant items from 
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the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson & Tellegen, 1988). Study 2 
included additional questions on confidence and sense of control. 
Results 
Self-control measure 
We used the same compound measure of self-control as in Study 1, and assessed 
several additional variables known to correlate with high self-control (Mischel et al., 
2011; Moffitt et al., 2011). Validating our measure of self-control, we found it positively 
correlated with education, r = .16 (p = .05) and income, r =.21 (p = .01), and inversely 
with body mass index (BMI), r = -.18 (p = .03). This replicates the results from Study 1 
on income, and adds two additional measures, BMI and education. 
Illusion of control 
To establish whether our results generalize to both genders and a wider range of 
age groups, we first analyzed the results of Study 2 separately for the two genders, 
breaking the sample into three age groups (18-28, 29-41, and 42-77), and found very 
similar results for most parts, albeit typically with stronger effects for young males.  Thus, 
we report the results for the combined sample.11  As shown in Figure 1(a), once again, 
high self-controllers actually believe that they follow their feelings less than do low self-
controllers, t(177) = -1.87 (p = .03), relying instead on more analytic approaches, 
consistent with a belief in having specific control over their outcomes.12 On the PANAS, 
shown in Figure 1(b) they reported themselves as less scared, t(182) = -1.8 (p = .04) and 
less afraid, t(182) = -1.63 (p = .05), and conversely, more inspired, t(182) = 2.48 (p 
                                                
11 As we were testing specific directional predictions based on Study 1, all of the t-tests reported here are 
one-tailed. 
12 Note that for this and all subsequent illusion of control variables, results are stronger when we only look 
at younger males, in keeping with the initial sample. However, as we wanted to see if the initial findings 
would generalize, we are only reporting results for the full sample. 
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= .007), more active, t(182) = 3.08 (p = .001), more excited, t(182) = 2.62 (p = .01), and 
more attentive, t(182) = 1.84 (p = .04). High self-controllers were also less anxious 
overall, t(182) = -0.06 (p = .01) and more confident t(182) = 1.76 (p = .05). These 
emotional reports are again consistent with the emotional correlates of feeling in control. 
High self-controllers were also more likely to report that they were following a safe 
overall strategy on the CCT, t(182) = 2.22 (p = .01). Finally, with respect to questions 
specific to financial confidence, high self-controllers thought they were better than 
average in their financial decision making ability, t(183) = 2.77 (p = .003), were more 
likely to think they were proficient at managing their finances, t(183) = 1.59 (p = .05), 
were more confident in their ability to make good financial decisions, t(183) = 1.48 (p 
= .07) and get out of difficult financial situations, t(183) = 1.72 (p = .04), more 
satisfied with their overall finances, t(183) = 2.37 (p =.01), and ranked their overall 
financial situation “these days” as significantly better than others’, t(183) = 2.92 (p 
= .002), suggesting that their confidence extends to the real-world financial domain.  
Finally, we found that high self-controllers were more likely than low self-
controllers to be currently invested in the stock market, t(182) = 3.02 (p = .002), and to 
have been investing there for longer periods of time, between 4-8 years, t(183) = 3.14 (p 
= .001). They were also more likely to have been invested in the market at the time of 
the 2008 crash, t(183) = 3.36 (p < .001), to report having lost a significant portion of 
their investment in the crash, t(183) = 3.05 (p = .002), and to report that the recession 
had a significant impact on their investment approach, t(183) = 2.83 (p < .001). They 
were also more likely to follow the financial news t(183) = 1.73 (p = .04). These 
findings, even though only self reports, at least begin to suggest potential real-world 
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ramifications for risky financial decisions for high self-controllers. Moreover, if taken 
with the behavioral results that suggest a lower risk-taking adjustment in response to 
negative environmental cues, they suggest that high self-controllers may not always be 
aware of their own behavior. In other words, even though they report that the recession 
significantly altered their investment behavior, our experimental evidence, namely that 
high self-controllers adjust their risk-taking less than low under stress, suggests that this 
may not actually be the case. If it is true that there is in fact a disconnect between high 
self-controllers’ perception of their behavior adjustment in the real world and the degree 
of that actual adjustment, it would provide greater evidence for illusory control and 
overconfidence biases, as they would perceive themselves to be changing behavior when 
they are not in fact doing so.  
Effects of illusion of control on risk-taking 
To see how the illusion of control affected risk-taking in the two tasks, in 
conjunction with self-control and stress, we ran two separate ANOVAs with stress, self-
control, and the two emotional correlates of the illusion of control identified earlier, 
namely anxiety and confidence, as the predictor variables and LGT average bet size as 
the dependent variable in the first case, and CCT average number of cards chosen in the 
second. Anxiety and confidence were arrived at by a factor analysis of the PANAS self-
report associated emotions.13 We then performed a median split on each variable. For the 
LGT, we found that self-control marginally predicted risk taking, F(1,171) = 2.79 (p 
= .09), as did anxiety F(1,171) = 3.24 (p = .07). The interaction of stress × confidence 
was significant F(1,171) = 6.62 (p = .01). 
                                                
13 The following components loaded on the anxiety factor: Distressed, upset, jittery, nervous, afraid, scared, 
guilty, hostile, irritable, and ashamed. The following components loaded on the confidence factor: Strong, 
proud, enthusiastic, determined, attentive, active, and excited. 
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Behaviorally, these results translate to high self-controllers again betting less 
overall than low self-controllers ($0.44, SE =  .03 as opposed to $0.51, SE = .03) on the 
LGT. Anxiety, however, led to an increase in betting, with individuals high in anxiety 
betting on average $0.51 (SE = .03), in contrast to low anxiety individuals, who bet on 
average $0.44 (SE = .03). This effect points to the possibility that a generalized state of 
anxiety, irrespective of the potential losses associated with a given task, may lead to 
greater sensitivity to environmental feedback, and consequently, more nuanced 
behavioral adjustment based on that feedback. Here, then, we also see negative states 
leading to more optimal decisions, and again, the benefit is conferred on the low self-
controllers more so than the high, because they experience greater anxiety. Figure 2(b) 
shows anxiety’s effect on risk-taking separately for high versus low self-controllers.14 
For the CCT, we found a significant interaction, self-control × anxiety × stress 
(F(1,179) = 4.11; p = .04), which is shown by stress condition in Figure 3(b) and (c). For 
low self-controllers, anxiety decreased the number of cards chosen in the stress condition, 
leading to better overall performance, with 7.6 cards taken (SE = 0.57): among the low 
self-controllers, this was the best performing group (a difference of 1.36 cards as 
compared to the worst performers, the low-anxiety/high self-control stress group, at 8.96 
cards, SE = .47), consistent with our prior observations that both stress and the presence 
of anxiety tend to decrease risk-taking in this paradigm and improve performance for 
those low in self-control. For high self-controllers, neither anxiety nor stress had an 
appreciable impact on risk-taking behavior, again consistent with our hypothesis that high 
self-controllers tend to disregard negative environmental cues and that such cues bear 
                                                
14 There are far fewer high anxiety/high self-control individuals in general; hence, while the effect on them 




little on their behavior. The difference between the best and worst performing high self-
controller group was only .55 cards.  
On the CCT, we were again able to parse out the effect of the three components 
that varied between rounds (loss amount, gain amount, and probability) on risk-taking, 
and run separate ANOVAs predicting each of these effects, as described in Study 1, with 
the addition of anxiety and confidence as predictor variables. Once again, the only major 
difference between high and low self-controllers was in their response to loss amount, 
with high self-controllers being less sensitive to loss amount. We found a significant 
effect for anxiety, F(1,178) = 6.57 (p = .01), though the interaction for self-control × 
anxiety was not significant, F(1,178) = 2.56 (p = .11). The presence of anxiety increased 
sensitivity to loss amount, with higher anxiety individuals adjusting more to losses, and 
low self-controllers adjusted to losses more than did high self-controllers, in both the high 
and low-anxiety groups. As in Study 1, there were no significant differences between 
groups on the effects of gain amount or probability levels on risk-taking. 
Thus, we again see low self-controllers exhibiting greater responsiveness to 
negative external inputs, be it to stress or to loss information, through heightened anxiety 
and subsequent adjustment of their behavior, while high self-controllers do not exhibit 
this effect, remaining both lower in anxiety and higher in confidence and failing to 
adequately adjust risk-taking on our tasks of risky choice.  
Why the distinct risk-taking patterns? 
One outstanding questions concerns the differential patterns of risk observed on 
the LGT and the CCT. One possible explanation is that the two tasks are perceived 
differently. The LGT requires a single decision that translates directly to a monetary 
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outcome. How much of my money should I bet? On the CCT, there is a disconnect 
between risk-taking and financial outcomes. Initial decisions generally do not lead to the 
final financial outcome, and if the participant is lucky (i.e., does not encounter a loss 
card), he can keep earning without losing, thus encountering more positive than negative 
feedback, since more gain than loss cards are turned over during the game. That may well 
be why high self-controllers take more risk on the CCT, driven by the illusion of control 
and confidence effects described, but not on the LGT, which becomes a much more 
discrete and specifically financial decision.  
While that reasoning is suggested by both studies 1 and 2, results from Study 2 
offer additional support, by way of our direct questions about preferred real-life financial 
strategy in stock market investment. High self-controllers, as opposed to low, stated that 
they follow a moderate returns approach, whereby they hope to return some profit and 
not to lose their whole investment, t(183) = 3.67 (p < .001). Furthermore, they reported 
that they are less likely to take risks in general, t(183) = -1.68 (p = .05). It would 
therefore make sense that when they perceive the risk of losing real money, their earnings, 
to be real, they take less risk, despite their general absence of anxiety and confidence in 
their own ability; those two factors come into play when the prospect of immediate 
financial loss, based on a discrete investment decision, is not as salient, as on the CCT. 
Discussion 
Study 1 used a sample that was heavily male and young, to mimic the 
demographics of financial professionals. Our replication with a broader sample in Study 
2 shows that the illusion of control effects identified in the first study did indeed 
generalize across age and gender, and that the emotional correlates drove risk-taking 
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behavior in the same direction: namely, higher anxiety led to improved risk-taking (more 
risk on the LGT, less on the CCT), while higher confidence led to increases in risk-taking 
on both tasks. Low self-controllers again seemed to incorporate negative information 
more into their behavior than did high, reacting more to stress and exhibiting higher 
overall anxiety in both paradigms.  
We expand the effect to include the perception of real-world financial behaviors 
and further demonstrate that the emotional correlates that are consistent with an illusion 
of control impact risk-taking behavior on the CCT and the LGT, and more specifically, 
the adjustment to negative external cues, such as stress and loss information (which, in 
both Study 1 and Study 2, is the only differentiating factor on the CCT between high and 
low self-controllers). High self-controllers experience less anxiety and greater confidence. 
This affective experience in turn leads to a lack of behavioral adjustment when such 
adjustment may actually be advantageous. Moreover, the effects of anxiety are stronger 
in low self-controllers than in high. 
Consistent with such an effect, we find that overall, high self-controllers 
consistently take less risk than do low self-controllers in the LGT, while low self-
controllers take greater risks and are thus closer to the optimal strategy (using risk and 
loss neutrality as benchmark for optimal decisions that maximize financial outcomes in 
the task). On this task, anxiety leads to an increase in betting, an effect that selectively 
aids the performance of low self-controllers: low self-controllers, who are high in anxiety, 
outperform high self-controllers, who are low in anxiety, by an average of $0.27 (out of 
$1) on each round. On the CCT, we find that high self-controllers take more risk than 
advisable (Study 1), or fail to adjust their risk-taking sufficiently (Study 2), thus allowing 
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those low in self-control to either overtake them in performance or continue 
outperforming them when stress is increased. In Study 2, we show that both anxiety and 
stress play into this difference in performance and behavioral adjustment. 
One possible explanation for the discrepant risk-taking patterns is the differential 
nature of the financial loss prospect in the two tasks. The LGT has surface similarity to 
financial investing tasks, whereas the CCT has the surface features of a gambling task. 
Numerous studies find that people show different degrees of risk taking in investing vs. 
gambling situations (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), though typically, risk-taking in these 
two contexts is not analyzed as a function of the self-control ability of the decision 
makers. As high self-controllers report wanting to follow a more moderate investment 
strategy, to avoid the possibility of large losses, and report a lower willingness to take 
risks, in a situation such as the LGT where the risk and loss are specifically financial and 
both immediate and salient, they may scale down their risk-taking, be it beneficial or not. 
In contrast, on the CCT, absent the same immediacy, they can rely on their confidence in 
their own luck in chance environments. In both cases, erroneous starting beliefs lead to 
poor strategic choices, which are then compounded by a subsequent failure to reassess or 
adjust the strategy given the circumstances. It would stand to reason, then, that the true 
failure is to update risk-taking strategy strategically in an environment where there is 
little control over actual outcomes and where negative environmental cues might actually 
contain important information, sticking instead to a strategy dictated more by original 
surface considerations. 
While high self-controllers would still be expected to perform well in any 
environment where they actually have control over their outcomes, or where there is no 
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disconnect between their initial strategic assessment and the situation at hand, they may 
falter in a stochastic environment where either of the following is true: (1) There are 
salient financial choices that may lead to immediate actual loss, as in the LGT, where 
high self-controllers’ general aversion to risking their own capital and taking something 
that they perceive to be a financial risk might lead them to take too little risk at the end of 
the day; or (2) The financial gains and losses are somewhat masked by the non-
immediacy of the potential loss, as in the CCT, where the incremental perception that 
control is possible is further compounded by the fact that only three rounds will actually 
matter, so if a high self-controller believes himself to be lucky, he has two reasons to take 
greater risks: the first, that he won’t hit a loss card because he is “good” in chance 
situations, and the second, that even if he were to hit a loss round, it is not likely to count, 
as again, his luck will see him through to payment of the more successful rounds. We 
have, then, two major factors at play, namely, the nature of the perceived situation and 
the disconnect between perceived control and actual control. Each of these factors can 
impede performance for high self-controllers under circumstances where there is little 
actual control, and an initial assessment of game strategy may differ from the assessment 
one would obtain by looking at feedback from the environment.  
These findings strengthen our hypotheses about the dynamics that might have 
played a role in real world financial crises like the 2008 market crash, which seems to 
have more of the characteristics of the CCT: financial losses are possible, but not 
immediate, and decisions are made incrementally and not as all-or-none decisions. They 
show that the effects of Study 1 are consistent, not an anomaly, and that they generalize 
across age and gender. However, they remain correlational—and the CCT and LGT are 
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still removed from the world of stock market decisions. Thus, for our next series of 
studies, we propose to use a new task which looks at more germane financial behavior, 
and we further propose to manipulate the three variables of interest—the illusion of 
control, affect, and self-control—to determine what are the precise causal mechanisms 








In Study 3, we wanted to move beyond the observed correlations of Studies 1 and 
2—and to do so with a task that was less removed from the real-world financial behavior 
we were trying to capture. To do so, we manipulated the illusion of control, adapting a 
standard measure from the 1970s (Langer & Roth, 1975) to an online, incentive-
compatible environment, and used as our main dependent variable the Behavioral 
Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), which—apart from 
being a more direct measure of financial risk-taking in a stock market-like setting—is 
known to be mediated by affect (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005; Knutson & Bossaerts, 2007; 
Samanez-Larkin, Wagner, & Knutson, 2010), in line with our predicted mediation. 
We found that, once again, high self-controllers were outperformed by low self-
controllers when it came to making optimal decisions. We further found that inducing 
IOC increased the number of errors committed on the BIAS task by both high and low 
self-controllers: individuals in the IOC condition made fewer optimal choices and 
performed worse overall, confirming our suspicion that IOC can be responsible for sub-
optimal choices on financial risk-taking in stochastic environments. 
Method 
Participants 
 133 participants (64 male, 69 female; mean age = 36.3, SD = 12.33) from a 
national sample took part in the study, after providing informed consent. For this and all 
subsequent studies (Study 4 and Study 5), we used participants from an online sample 
known as Mechanical Turks, an online labor system run by Amazon.com. These workers 
have been shown to be highly reliable and motivated, providing data in keeping with 
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strict quality standards and responses that are largely in line with traditional laboratory 
samples (Mason & Sury, 2010; Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2012). Paolacci, Chandler, 
and Ipeirotis (2010) are among the groups that are currently replicating classic findings 
from social and cognitive psychology in this group, and so far, have demonstrated a 
successful replication of three classic experimental studies: the Asian Disease Problem 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), and the 
physician problem (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Experiment 1, Cases 1 and 2).   
In keeping with Amazon best practices, participants were paid $2 for their 
participation (significantly higher than the average hourly wage for the site). They were 
also entered into a lottery where they would be eligible to win the payouts from their 
decisions in the entire study, as all behavioral measures were incentive-compatible. 
Materials and Procedure 
Go/No-Go Paradigm. The same Go/No-Go task (2 blocks of 140 trials each) that 
was used in Studies 1 and 2 was used to assess self-control in Study 3. Stimuli were 
separated by an interstimulus interval (fixation cross) of 500ms.  
After completing the Go/No-Go, participants were randomly assigned to an 
illusion of control (IOC) induction or control condition, two versions of the Coin Flip 
game. 
Coin Flip. The Coin Flip is an IOC manipulation adapted from Langer & Roth 
(1975). Simplifying Langer’s original design, we employed a simple descending active vs. 
random active design, the two conditions that were found to have the highest and lowest 
effect, respectively, in Langer’s original study and subsequent replications. Participants 
in both conditions had to actively choose heads or tails on 30 rounds of a coin toss. After 
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each choice, the computer flipped the coin, and the participant saw whether he won or 
lost. The sequence of wins and losses was predetermined in both conditions, using the 
sequences originally developed by Langer. In the descending (IOC) induction condition, 
wins were clustered at the beginning of the trials, to form the following sequence, with W 
signifying a win and L, a loss: 
WWWWLWWWLLLWWWLLWLLWWLLLWLLLLW 
In the random (control) condition, the wins were interspersed with the losses in a 
seemingly random pattern, to form the following sequence: 
WLWLLWLWLWWLLWLLWLWWWLWLWLLWLW 
The total number of wins and losses was constant for both sequences; the only difference 
was the order of the outcomes. 
 We further modified Langer’s original induction by including an incentive-
compatible dimension as a direct measure of confidence. On each round, participants 
could make a sliding bet on each outcome, from $0 to $0.05. They were told that they 
would be entered into a lottery where the winnings (or losses) from the game would be 
added to (or subtracted from) their total earnings for the study, creating a strong incentive 
for bets that corresponded to actual confidence in outcome correctness.15 Following the 
task, we also included Langer’s standard induction check questions: (1) How good to you 
think you are at predicting outcomes like these? (0 = very bad; 5 = average; 10 = pretty 
good); (2) How well do you think you would do on the task if you were distracted? (0 = 
much worse; 10 = much better); and (3) How much do you think you would improve 
with practice? (0 = not at all; 5 = some improvement; 10 = a good deal). We anticipated, 
                                                
15 While bets of $0-$0.05 may not seem like a great deal of money, recall that participants were being paid 
only $2 for a study that lasted close to one hour and that these earnings presented an opportunity to change 
that amount significantly—by up to $1.50, or almost the entire base earnings amount. 
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however, that the bet size would be a more valid indicator of induction strength and 
subsequent choice confidence, as it had actual consequences for overall earnings. 
Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS). After completing the Coin 
Flip task, participants proceeded to the major dependent measure of the study, the 
Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005).  
The task was an incentive-compatible, computer-administered game of financial 
risk-taking, with 10 blocks of 10 trials each. On each trial, participants were presented 
with three assets: two stocks and one bond. At the beginning of each block, the two 
stocks were randomly assigned to either a “good” stock or a “bad” stock condition, such 
that in any block, one stock was always good and the other, always bad. The good stock 
always had the following payoff probabilities: +$10 with a 50% probability; +$0 with a 
25% probability; -$10 with a 25% probability. The bad stock, on the other hand, always 
had flipped payoff probabilities: +$10 with a 25% probability; +$0 with a 25% 
probability; and -$10 with a 50% probability. The bond always paid out $1. On each trial, 
earnings were drawn independently from these distributions. The assignment of “good” 
and “bad” stock was repeated at the start of each block of 10 trials. 
Each trial proceeded as follows (See Figure 5). First, participants saw the three 
assets on a screen. The word “CHOOSE” then appeared, and participants pressed one of 
three keys (1 for Stock T, 2 for Bond C, and 3 for Stock R), to select one of the three 
assets. They were then shown their earnings for the current trial and the experiment up to 
that point, and after a delay of 2 seconds, they were shown the “market” value of all three 
assets (in other words, what they would have gained or lost had they chosen any one of 




They then moved on to the next trial. 
Participants were given full information about the task, including the possible 
probability distributions, at the start of the game. They also completed five practice trials 
and answered questions about possible payoffs to ensure full understanding of game rules. 
Incorrect answers prevented participants from advancing to the main task. At the start of 
each block of trials, participants were once again reminded of the rules, and were told to 
keep in mind that the good and bad stock assignments would be repeated at the start of 
the block, irrespective of stock identity in preceding blocks.  
To create a more life-like environment, participants were also subjected to a time 
constraint: they had three seconds to make their choice on each trial. A failure to make a 
choice would result in no earnings for the trial. 
Participants were told that one-tenth of their earnings from the BIAS task would 
be added to their total earnings for the study, and that they would be entered into a lottery 
to collect those earnings after study completion.  
Immediately following the BIAS, participants completed the PANAS, as an affect 
check, and answered a series of questions about their perception of the task, including 
their confidence in their responses and their level of stress during the task (See Appendix 
A).  
BIAS background and use rationale 
Our decision to switch from the CCT and LGT to the BIAS was motivated by 
several factors. First, the BIAS is an actual investment task, with stocks and bonds. As 
such, it taps into the financial decisions we are trying to capture and helps increase the 
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apparent controllability of the outcomes (even though they are still both risky and 
uncertain, as in the real stock market). It also allows us to observe learning patterns, as 
participants must sample to determine the nature of each stocks. It captures two types 
deviations from optimal rational strategy, both important to investment success, as would 
be predicted by a pattern of Bayesian updating: risk-seeking mistakes (choosing a stock 
when the probability distributions given past choices favor a bond) and risk-aversion 
mistakes (choosing a bond when the probability distributions given past choices favor a 
stock). Finally, it has been tied to affective differences in the brain, thus supplementing a 
causal affect story for the observed behaviors. 
 The BIAS task was first created by Camelia Kuhnen and Brian Knutson (2005) to 
examine investor behavior in picking stocks: namely, why did individual investors 
systematically deviate from optimal behavior, be it by taking on too little or too much 
risk relative to the available information? Kuhnen and Knutson assumed that emotion 
might be to blame, positing that neural activation, specifically, in the nucleus accumbens 
(NAcc) of the ventral striatum and anterior insula—linked to anticipation of monetary 
gains and positive aroused affect in the former case (Knutson, Delgado, & Phillips, 2008; 
Knutson & Bossaerts, 2007; Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; Knutson, 
Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; Bjork et al., 2003) and to negative affect in 
the latter (Wager, Phan, Liberzon & Taylor, 2003; Simmons, Matthews, Stein, & Paulus, 
2004)—would predict financial choices. They found that NAcc activation preceded both 
risky choices and risk-seeking mistakes and that anterior insula activation preceded 
riskless choices and risk-aversion mistakes, lending support to an affective model of sub-
optimal economic decision making in a stock market environment. 
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 In a 2010 follow-up (Samanez-Larkin, Wagner, and Knutson, 2010), they further 
found that rational choices on the BIAS correlated with real-world financial assets. That 
is, individuals who had made a greater number of rational choices also reported having 
more real-world wealth. They also found that rational choices decreased with age, even 
after controlling for education, numeracy, and performance on a number of tasks of 
cognitive ability, namely Letter-Number Sequencing, Digit Span, and Trail-Making Test. 
Specifically, they saw an increase in risk-seeking and confusion mistakes (see also Mata, 
Josef, Samanez-Larking, & Hertwig, 2011). They posited that a learning deficit may lead 
to greater risk-taking on the task, and that older adults were not learning as quickly—the 
same prediction we made, in turn, for high self-controllers. 
Individual difference measures. In addition to our main variables of interest, the 
study included several individual difference measures that were chosen for their relation 
to self-control and illusory control. Specifically, we administered the Internal-External 
Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966); the Generalized Expectancy for Success Scale 
(GESS; Fibel & Hale, 1978); the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, 
& Barratt, 1995); and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). We also included a number of health and demographic measures.  
The individual difference measures were interspersed throughout the study and 
counterbalanced with the IOC induction to avoid any order effects.16 Demographic 




                                                





 Following the results of Casey et al. (2011; also see Eigsti et al., 2006), whose 
findings demonstrated that performance on the delay of gratification task in childhood 
predicted the efficiency of performance on the Go/No-go (as seen specifically by 
difficulty suppressing an inappropriate “go” response on the “nogo” trials) in adulthood, 
we used total commission errors, or false alarms, on the Go/No-go as our measure of self-
control.17 While we also looked at reaction time (RT) and errors of omission, those were 
used in exclusion criteria and not as part of the self-control measure, in keeping with the 
methodology of Casey et al. (2011).  
To validate our measure of self-control, we looked at correlations with other 
known correlates of self-control, such as the BIS-11 scale and age. As expected, the 
commission errors correlated significantly with the BIS-11 self-control subscale (r = .22 ; 
p = .01), the BIS-11 attention subscale ( r = .21, p = .02), the BIS-11 attentional second-
order factor subscale (r = .19, p = .03), and the BIS-11 non-planning second-order factor 
subscale (r = .17, p = .05). We found a negative correlation with age (r = -.195, p = .03), 
in keeping with the common finding that self-control tends to increase in older adults. 
Effect of the illusion of control induction 
Induction validation 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the illusion of control in 
the induction versus the control condition. We had one major behavioral measure of 
illusory control in the coin flip: the amount of money each participant bet on the 
                                                
17 In Studies 3-5, the correlation with the BIS-11 self-control subscale remained significant but was not 
high enough to warrant the creation of a composite measure. We felt that commission errors alone would 
provide a cleaner analysis and used the BIS-11 as further validation of our measure. 
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correctness of his guess on each trial, a direct behavioral measure of outcome confidence. 
We found a significant difference in total amount bet (Mcontrol = .74, SDcontrol = .48, 
Minduction = .96 , SDinduction = .52; t(131) = -2.52,  p = .013) in the two conditions. In other 
words, those in the induction condition bet on average $0.22 more over the course of the 
coin flip’s 30 trials, suggesting a greater degree of confidence in the correctness of their 
choices and validating our induction manipulation.  
Induction effect on BIAS self-reported IOC 
As a result of increased bet size, participants in the IOC condition actually earned 
significantly less than those in the control condition (Mcontrol = .03, SDcontrol =.07, 
Minduction = -.01, SDinduction = .06; t(131) = 3.66, p < .001) on the coin flip – and yet, their 
perception of superior performance remained largely in place throughout the remainder 
of the study, affecting their subsequent perception of their performance in the BIAS game. 
Specifically, those in the induction condition thought that they were following the best 
strategy in the game more often than those in the control condition (Mcontrol = 2.61, 
SDcontrol = 1.31, Minduction = 3.06; SDinduction = 1.31; t(131) = -1.79, p = .07) and stated that 
they felt more in control during the game than did those in the control condition (Mcontrol 
= 2.5, SDcontrol = 1.26, Minduction = 2.96; SDinduction = 1.49; t(131) = -1.9, p = .06). They 
also reported marginally lower levels of stress (Mcontrol = 2.68, SDcontrol = 1.45, Minduction = 
2.3; SDinduction = 1.37; t(131) = 1.56, p = .12). 
Induction effect on PANAS affect measure 
We then turned to our main measure of affect, the PANAS. The IOC 
manipulation impacted negative affect in our sample: specifically, those in the induction 
condition reported feeling less guilty (Mcontrol = 1.47, SDcontrol = .99, Minduction = 1.20; 
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SDinduction = .62; t(131) = 1.91, p = .05), nervous (Mcontrol = 1.81, SDcontrol = 1.11, Minduction 
= 1.52; SDinduction = .86; t(131) = 1.67, p = .09), and afraid (Mcontrol = 1.39, SDcontrol = .86, 
Minduction = 1.17; SDinduction = .53; t(131) = 1.79, p = .09) than those in the control 
condition. Overall level of anxiety was marginally significant (Mcontrol = 6.79, SDcontrol = 
3.38, Minduction = 5.93; SDinduction = 3.01; t(131) = 1.55, p = .12). 
As predicted, then, participants felt less anxious as their illusion of control 
increased. 
Induction effect on high versus low self-controllers 
At the beginning of the study, we were afraid that high self-controllers would 
exhibit a ceiling effect in their overall IOC levels, resulting in a lack of induction efficacy 
for half the sample. We therefore performed an ANOVA, with amount bet on the coin 
flip as the dependent variable and induction condition and self-control level as the 
independent variables, to see whether the manipulation had a differential effect on high 
versus low self-controllers. We found that self-control was highly significant (F(1,133) = 
10.36, p = .002) and the IOC induction was significant (F(1,133) = 4.50, p = .04). The 
interaction effect, however, was non-significant (p = .94), suggesting that the induction 
worked with equal strength on both high and low self-controllers. Both high and low self-
controllers continued to bet more overall in the IOC induction condition, regardless of 
baseline level of control (see Figure 6). 
Risk-Taking and performance on BIAS 
Our main measure of interest was performance on the BIAS task: how would high 
self-controllers perform relative to low, and would the IOC induction make a difference 
in performance? To answer these questions, we first computed the optimal choice for 
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each participant for each trial of each block, given the available information. We defined 
optimal behavior as the choice a risk-neutral agent would make on any given trial. 
Specifically, the rational risk-neutral actor should only choose the stock if he expects the 
payoff to be at least as large as the $1 risk-free payoff associated with the bond. On every 
round, he should update his belief in the probability that each stock is the optimal one 
according to Bayes’ rule. 
To compute the optimal portfolio selection strategy, we followed the 
methodology outlined by Kuhnen & Knutson (2005; also see Samanez-Larkin et al., 
2010), the creators of the BIAS task. Thus, for this study, as well as Studies 4 and 5, we 
make the following assumptions.  
Calculating optimal portfolio selection strategy 
During each trial, τ, in each block, the risk-neutral rational agent should pick 
stock i if he expects the dividend, Diτ, from the stock to be at least as large as the 
earnings he would receive from choosing the bond, or $1. In other words, he will pick the 
stock if: 
 
 E[Diτ|Iτ1]>= E[DBτ |Iτ-1] = 1, where Iτ-1 is the information set, up to trial τ-1. 
So, Iτ-1={Dit| ∀t≤τ-1, ∀i∈{Stock T, Stock R, Bond C}}. 
 







The rational risk-neutral agent will only pick stock i when his belief xτi is such that: 
  3.5 * (2xτi – 1) ≥ 1 ⇔ ≥ 0.7 
 
If the rational risk-neutral agent’s beliefs are weak (in other words, if xτi <0.7, ∀i ∈{Stock 
T, Stock R}, the optimal strategy continues to be for the agent to choose the sure payoff of 
the $1 bond. In each round, he will update his belief according to Bayes’ Rule and choose 
accordingly. 
As per Kuhnen & Knutson (2005), we define the uncertainty of each trial as min 
(xτi,xτj), where i,j ∈{StockT,StockR} and i ≠ j. 
Measuring optimal choice and risk-seeking and risk-aversion mistakes 
After computing the optimal strategy for each trial, we created a simple binary 
variable for each participant for each trial of each block: 0 for a non-optimal choice, and 
1 for the optimal choice. We then created a second variable, to code for each non-optimal 
choice. If the first binary variable was 0 (i.e., a non-optimal choice), we then ran a 
comparison between observed choice and optimal choice to code for either risk-averse or 
risk-seeking errors in behavior. We then proceeded to analyze both the overall effect of 
self-control and the effect of the IOC induction on BIAS behavior. 
To mirror our approach in Studies 1 and 2 and for ease of interpretation and report, 
in keeping with usual reporting of results in studies of self-control (see, for example, 
Casey et al., 2011; Mischel et al., 2011), we performed a median split on our key measure 
of self-control and proceeded to analyze the data with a series of ANOVAs. However, as 
this approach does gloss over much of the individual-level data provided in the BIAS, we 
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supplemented this analysis with a hierarchical (i.e., mixed) generalized linear model fit 
by restricted maximum likelihood ratios (REML). The results of the analyses, while 
providing greater granularity of interpretation, mirror substantially the results presented 
in the bodies of Study 3, 4, and 5. The full models and findings are provided in Appendix 
B. Here, as well as in the Results section of studies 4 and 5, I will be reporting only the 
results of the median split ANOVA analyses. 
Risk-taking in high and low self-controllers on the BIAS 
To measure behavior on the BIAS, we performed three separate ANOVAs, with 
self-control and IOC induction condition as the predictor variables and optimal choices, 
risk-seeking choices, and risk-averse choices as the dependent measures in the first, 
second, and third ANOVA, respectively.18 We found that, just as they had done on the 
CCT and LGT, high self-controllers once again performed worse overall on this task of 
financial risk-taking: they committed more errors across the board. They made more risk-
averse mistakes in all conditions, F(1,129) = 5.92 (p = .02), committing an average of 
44.39 errors (SD = 21.57), as compared to the 39.04 errors (SD = 18.99) committed by 
their low self-control counterparts. Condition was also highly significant, F(1,129) = 6.44 
(p = .01), with both high and low self-controllers committing more errors in the IOC 
induction (Mlow,control = 32.00; SDlow,control = 18.27; Mlow,induction = 43.51, SDlow,induction = 
18.27; Mhigh,control = 42.31; SDhigh,control = 20.28; Mhigh,induction = 46.6, SDhigh,induction = 23.00 
(see Figure 7). For risk-seeking mistakes, the results were only marginally significant, 
F(1,129) = 3.38 (p = .06), and the optimal choice analysis, while directionally correct 
(high self-controllers made fewer optimal choices as compared to low across the board, 
and especially in the IOC induction condition), was non-significant. 
                                                




A mediation analysis using multiple mediation bootstrapping (Shrout & Bolger, 
2002) examined whether anxiety and/or confidence (aggregated from participant PANAS 
scores)19 mediated the relationship between self-control and risk-taking. Unfortunately, 
we found no significant mediation in this study: while there was a marginally significant 
effect of confidence on risk-averse mistakes (B = .37, p = .06), the baseline effect of self-
control remained significant even after the mediation (B = .37, p = .05 before mediation; 
B = .37, p = .04 after mediation). 
Discussion 
In Study 3, we replicated the behavioral results of Studies 1 and 2 by showing that 
individuals high in self-control committed more errors and performed worse on a task of 
risky decision making. As the BIAS is a much more germane measure to our main 
behavior of interest, real-world financial risk-taking in a stock market environment, 
finding this overall effect was an important first step in translating our earlier findings to 
a more realistic setting. 
We then went a step beyond earlier work by experimentally manipulating the 
illusion of control. In theory, if increased susceptibility to illusory control is indeed 
responsible for the relatively poor performance of high self-controllers in such stochastic 
environments, inducing IOC in low self-controllers should have an adverse impact on 
their performance. In practice, we found just such an effect, with low self-controllers 
committing more errors in the induction as opposed to the baseline condition. 
                                                
19 Our positive affect “confidence” composite measure consisted of the interested, excited, strong, 
enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, and active items of the PANAS. Our negative 
affect “anxiety” composite measure consisted of the distressed,  upset, nervous, and afraid items of the 
PANAS. The same aggregate measures are used in Study 4 and Study 5. 
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However, we did not find an interaction effect between self-control and condition, 
nor did we find a significant affect mediation, as we had expected. We attribute this to the 
strong effects of baseline self-control relative to the IOC induction: while the induction 
did affect initial self-perception and behavior, it was not strong enough to override the 
baseline differences in the two groups. 
From Study 3, we can conclude that the IOC does in fact cause a decrease in 
performance accuracy in risky financial decision making, and that the relationship is 
causal, not purely correlational. We do not, however, have deeper insight into the precise 
reasons for this effect. 
We now turn to two further manipulations, one of affect (Study 4), and one of 
self-control directly (Study 5), in an attempt to further clarify the relationship between 
self-control, illusory control, and financial risk-taking, and pinpoint why exactly the 
illusion of control impedes performance – and how low and high self-controllers differ 







 Study 4 was designed to further clarify the causal link between self-control, 
illusory control, and risk-taking behavior, by disambiguating the exact mechanism 
through which illusory control impedes performance—and, ideally, seeing why that 
mechanism is so prevalent in high self-controllers, even in a baseline state. Motivated by 
the tantalizing differences in affect observed in Studies 1 and 2, findings that have linked 
high self-control to higher overall happiness levels and higher self-esteem (Ayduk et al., 
2000; Mischel et al., 2011), and work that has linked performance errors on the BIAS to 
anticipatory affect (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005), we posited that affect might be the key 
driver of the observed behavioral effects. In Study 4, we tested the affect mediation 
hypothesis: does the illusion of control promote risk-taking and inhibit optimal learning 
by boosting positive affect? 
We found that a positive affect induction reduced the number of optimal choices 
for low self-controllers on the BIAS task, making them look more like high self-
controllers in their decisions. This finding confirmed our initial suspicion that affect may 
be the main driver of the behavioral differences between low and high self-controllers 
and may be the key mediating mechanism in the susceptibility of high self-controllers to 
the illusion of control in limited control environments. 
Surprisingly, we also found that the induction actually improved performance by 
high self-controllers. Taken with parallel results from Study 5 (see Study 5 Results and 
Discussion), we attribute this improvement to a self-reflection and self-distancing 
mechanism, whereby drawing high self-controllers’ attention to their positive affect gives 
them the distance required for accurate reflection (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983)—and a 
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 112 participants (57 female, 55 male; mean age = 38,04, SD = 12.35) from an 
online national sample, Amazon’s Mechanical Turks, took part in the study, after 
providing informed consent. They were paid $2 for their participation and entered into a 
lottery to win the remaining earnings from the study. 
Materials and Procedure 
 Study 4 was structured identically to Study 3, with the exception of the induction 
condition. Instead of the IOC coin flip manipulation, immediately after the Go/No-go 
concluded, participants were randomly assigned to either a positive affect induction or a 
control condition. We used a standard positive affect induction, where participants were 
asked to write a brief paragraph about a time they made money in the stock market. In the 
control condition, they were asked to briefly describe a familiar stock.20 Our induction 
centered on the stock market so as to ensure that the affect was integral and not incidental 
to the study (for a discussion on the importance of the distinction, see, for example, 




We employed identical methodology to Study 3 for our measure of self-control. 
We once again used total commission errors on the Go/No-go as our main measure and 
                                                
20 See Appendix A for full induction text. 
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subsequently performed a median split to separate our sample into low and high self-
controllers. We validated the measure by once again comparing it to other standard 
correlates of self-control. This time, commission errors correlated only marginally with 
the BIS-11 attention subscale (r = .16, p = .1) and the BIS-11 attentional second-order 
factor subscale (r = .17, p = .07). However, we found the same significant inverse 
relationship with age as previously (r = -.23, p = .02), once again validating the known 
relationship between age and self-control, with self-control increasing as a function of 
age. 
Effect of the affect induction 
Induction validation 
 An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare positive and negative 
affect in the induction versus the control condition. Our major measure of affect was self-
reported affect in the PANAS, as well as a measure of how stressful participants found 
the BIAS task. Individuals in the induction condition reported feeling significantly more 
excited (Mcontrol = 2.78, SDcontrol = 1.16, Minduction = 3.37, SDinduction = 1.29; t(110) = 2.57,  
p = .01), enthusiastic (Mcontrol = 2.97, SDcontrol = 1.18, Minduction = 3.37, SDinduction = 1.28; 
t(110) = 1.74,  p = .09), proud (Mcontrol = 2.50, SDcontrol = 1.19, Minduction = 2.94, SDinduction 
= 1.34; t(110) = 1.86,  p = .07), and determined (Mcontrol = 3.29, SDcontrol = 1.34, Minduction 
= 3.70, SDinduction = 1.14; t(110) = 1.74,  p = .09) than those in the control condition, with 
an overall significant greater positive affect (Mcontrol = 34.26, SDcontrol = 9.62, Minduction = 
37.83, SDinduction = 9.42; t(110) = 1.99,  p = .05). They also reported feeling significantly 
less upset (Mcontrol = 1.90, SDcontrol = 1.2, Minduction = 1.50, SDinduction = .84; t(110) = -2.02,  
p = .05) and ashamed (Mcontrol = 1.55, SDcontrol = 1.06, Minduction = 1.2, SDinduction = .63; 
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t(110) = -2.09,  p = .04). On the illusion of control questions that followed the BIAS, they 
reported themselves more likely to have performed well overall than did those in the 
control condition (Mcontrol = 2.83, SDcontrol = 1.31, Minduction = 3.39, SDinduction = 1.27; 
t(110) = 2.30,  p = .02) and reported having followed a safer overall strategy (Mcontrol = 
3.21, SDcontrol = 1.21, Minduction = 3.72, SDinduction = 1.24; t(110) = 2.23,  p = .03), in 
keeping with prior findings that individuals higher in self-control (and thereby, in 
positive affect) are more likely to perceive themselves as behaving in a less risky fashion 
than warranted by actual behavior. 
Induction effect on high versus low self-controllers 
We suspected that we might find a ceiling effect in high self-controllers, reducing 
the efficacy of the induction on that group. To determine whether the induction condition 
differentially affected high versus low self-controllers, we performed an ANOVA, with 
the PANAS total positive affect score as the dependent variable and induction condition 
and self-control level as the independent variables. While the affect induction remained 
significant (F(1,111) = 4.23, p = .04), the interaction was insignificant (p = .26), 
suggesting that the induction had the same effect on both groups and no ceiling effect 
existed. 
Risk-taking and performance on BIAS 
 To determine performance on the BIAS, we used the same approach as in Study 3, 
creating a dichotomous variable for optimal versus non-optimal choices, based on our 
optimal portfolio selection strategy (detailed in Study 3), as would be predicted by a 
rational risk-neutral agent who uses a Bayesian updating strategy from round to round. 
We then once again took each non-optimal choice and coded it as either a risk-seeking or 
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risk-averse error by comparing it to the optimal strategy for each round. We then used the 
three resulting variables for optimal choice, risk-seeking error, and risk-averse error as 
our dependent variables in three separate ANOVAs, with self-control level and induction 
condition as the predictor variables. 
 In keeping with our expectations, we found a highly significant interaction effect 
between self-control and induction condition in predicting optimal choice on the BIAS 
task, F(1,109) = 7.67, p = .007, our main variable of interest. Individuals low in self-
control made fewer optimal choices in the induction condition than they did in the control 
condition, resembling high self-controllers in their decreased performance. Individuals 
high in self-control, however showed the opposite pattern: their optimal choices 
increased as a result of the induction. So, while their performance in the control condition 
was significantly worse than was that of low self-controllers, as expected, their dramatic 
increase in the induction condition put them above low self-controllers (See Figure 8). 
While the latter result was unexpected, we repeated it in Study 5 (see below) and attribute 
it to the higher overall level of self-reflective ability associated with high self-control: 
once high self-controllers’ attention was drawn to their positive affect, they were better 
able to account for that affect and thus, improve their decision making. No other effects 
were significant in the optimal choice ANOVA. 
When we examined the prevalence of risk-seeking errors, we found significant 
effects for both self-control (F(1,109) = 4.78, p = .03) and affect induction (F(1,109) = 
7.54, p = .01). The affect induction increased the number of risk-seeking errors for both 
low and high self-controllers, again making low self-controllers perform worse than they 
otherwise would as a result (see Figure 9). While high self-controllers made fewer risk-
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seeking errors than low in both conditions, they still performed worse overall, as they 
made a greater number of total errors, including errors of risk aversion, in keeping with 
our predictions and the results of the ANOVA for optimal choice. When we looked at 
risk-averse errors, we found significant effects for both self-control (F(1,109) = 3.92; p 
= .05) and the induction condition (F(1,109) = 6.88; p = .01). Both high and low self-
controllers made fewer errors of risk-aversion in the induction condition. 
It thus seems that the main behavioral driver of the decreased performance of low 
self-controllers in the affect condition is an increase in risk-seeking errors: while one type 
of error (risk-averse) decreased as a result of the induction, the decrease wasn’t enough to 
offset the increase in risk-seeking errors that led, ultimately, to a drop in optimal choice 
and overall performance. 
Discussion 
 In Study 4, we begin to develop a more nuanced picture of the precise causal 
mechanism through which the illusion of control negatively impacts high self-controllers’ 
performance on financial risk-taking tasks in stock market-like environments. Positive 
affect appears to be an incredibly strong driver of the observed behavior. Low self-
controllers, when induced into the positive affective state normally associated with high 
self-control, saw significant decreases in their performance, largely driven by an uptick in 
risk-seeking errors (again in keeping with illusory control and increased confidence 
relative to performance, i.e., overconfidence, which is often tied to increased risk-seeking 
behavior). These findings strengthen the possibility that the mechanism of action behind 
high self-controllers’ increased susceptibility to the illusion of control is indeed an 
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affective one, with a selective preference for positive feedback and worse performance as 
a result. 
Why did the induction improve performance for high self-controllers? One 
explanation lies in their increased self-reflection and distancing abilities. We know that 
metacognitive knowledge increases as a result of educational achievement and cognitive 
ability (Flavell, 1979), and that high self-controllers have better life outcomes on these 
and other related measures (Mischel et al., 2011; Casey et al., 2011; Moffitt et al, 2011). 
We also know that individuals high in childhood delay ability are better at a 
metacognitive and self-reflective monitoring and regulation of their behavior (Mischel & 
Mischel, 1983). We thus expect individuals high in self-control to be better at attaining 
the kind of self-knowledge that is instrumental to behavioral improvement. We further 
know that, in the case of affect specifically, drawing one’s attention to a source of affect 
can eliminate the effect of that affect on behavior (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003).  
From this, several things follow. High self-controllers have a generally higher 
positive affect, derived in part from their high average positive life outcomes—including 
better self-image and mental health (Shoda et al., 1990; Ayduk et al, 2000; Mischel et al., 
2011). Normally, that affect is a background driver of behavior. However, as they are 
also more self-aware, when the affect that is usually a subconscious motivator is made 
salient—as through a positive affect induction—they are suddenly alerted to its possible 
impact, and thus, manage their behavior accordingly. In compensating for their 
overconfidence relative to environments where actual control is limited, they are able to 
improve their behavior to the high levels that they are capable of achieving under normal 
circumstances. Low self-controllers, however, absent that general enhanced self-
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reflection ability, cognitive skill, and baseline high positive affect react to the induction 
as would be expected, and begin to resemble high self-controllers who have not had 
affect made salient and continue to act without compensating for its effects. 
This explanation provides an interesting suggestion for one way to improve the 
performance of high self-control individuals in situations where they might otherwise fall 
prey to overconfidence and illusory control, by drawing their attention to the relevant 
affective factors and thereby allowing them to reflect on the likely effect of those 
factors—and compensate accordingly in their subsequent behavior. 




Study 5 was designed as the last in the series of experiments to tease apart the 
exact causal mechanisms at play in the relationship between self-control, illusory control, 
and financial risk-taking. While the strong results of the affect manipulation in Study 4, 
coupled with our a priori hypotheses and earlier findings led us to suspect the primacy of 
affect in the observed behavioral shortcomings of high self-controllers in environments 
where actual control is impossible, one additional causal mechanism remained to be 
tested: a boost in perceived self-control. While the mechanism of action behind such a 
boost may well also be affective, it is possible that one’s feelings of control per se are 
also responsible for the observed effects. 
 In designing this experiment, we had two possibilities in mind. The first is that 
the same affective mechanisms observed in Study 4 would be responsible for any 
differences in behavior with a self-control induction—in other words, that inducing 
higher self-control would increase positive affect and as a result, make low self-
controllers act more like high. The second possibility is that there is an additional, non-
affective mechanism in play, rooted in a more cognitive perception of control.  
We found that, like the affect induction of Study 4, the self-control induction had 
a significant differential effect on high and low self-controllers. It decreased the number 
of optimal choices made by low self-controllers, again making them look more like high-
self-controllers—but, just as with the positive affect induction, it actually increased the 
number of optimal choices made by high self-controllers, lending further credence to our 
self-reflection and distancing explanation of high self-controllers’ improved performance 
in Study 4. The increase in positive affect that accompanied the self-control induction 
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was a significant mediator of the effect, leading us to conclude that the main mechanism 
of action is indeed an affective rather than a purely cognitive one. 
Method 
Participants 
 107 participants (60 female, 47 male), median age = 34.79 (SD = 12.29) took part 
in the study, after providing informed consent. As in studies 3 and 4, we used a national 
online sample consisting of Amazon Mechanical Turks. All participants were 
compensated $2 for their time and were entered into a lottery where they had the chance 
to win all of their additional earnings from the study, 
Materials and procedures 
 The study was designed identically to Studies 3 and 4, with the exception of the 
induction condition. Instead of the IOC coin flip or affect manipulation, we used a 
standard self-control induction, where participants were asked to describe four separate 
occasions on which they had exercised self-control. In the control condition, they were 
asked to describe four shopping decisions.21 Our induction was meant to boost levels of 
perceived self-control in study participants. 
Results 
Self-control measure 
We once again used errors of commission on the Go/No-go as our major measure 
of self-control. For our main behavioral analyses, we used a median split on the 
commission variable to divide participants into high and low self-controllers. 
As in prior studies, we validated our measure of self-control by examining 
correlations with other known measures of self-control. The commission errors correlated 
                                                
21 For full text of induction and control, see Appendix A. 
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significantly with the BIS attention subscale (r = .231, p = .01), the BIS cognitive 
instability subscale (r = .24, p = .01), the BIS self-control subscale (r = .16, p = .05), and 
the BIS attentional second-order factor subscale (r = .27, p = .003). This time, the 
expected negative correlation with age was directionally accurate but only marginally 
significant (r  = -.14, p = .08). However, the correlation with BMI—a known correlate of 
lifetime self-control (Schlam et al., 2013)—was highly significant (r = .26, p = .005), 
providing further validation of our measure. 
Effect of self-control induction 
Induction validation 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare reported self-control in 
the induction versus the control condition. In keeping with previously observed results 
for individuals who are high in self-control, participants in the induction condition 
reported taking significantly more risk on the BIAS (Mcontrol = 3.10, SDcontrol = 1.19, 
Minduction = 3.60, SDinduction = 1.37; t(104) = -2.01,  p = .05) and feeling less stressed 
(Mcontrol = 3.08, SDcontrol = 1.35, Minduction = 2.60, SDinduction = 1.31; t(104) = 1.85,  p = .07). 
Their self-reports of several additional measures of self-control also changed. They 
reported a more internalized locus of control, in keeping with the internal locus 
associated with high self-controllers (Mcontrol = 12.31, SDcontrol = 4.39, Minduction = 10.86, 
SDinduction = 4.44, where lower scores signify a more internalized locus and higher, a more 
externalized; t(105) = 2.57,  p = .09), and significantly lower scores on the attention and 
attentional second-order subscales of the BIS-11, where, once again, higher scores 
correspond to lower self-control (attention: Mcontrol = 10.35, SDcontrol = 3.01, Minduction = 
9.16, SDinduction = 2.57; t(105) = 2.21,  p = .03; attention second-order: Mcontrol = 16.65, 
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SDcontrol = 3.99, Minduction = 15.07, SDinduction = 3.80; t(105) = 2.09,  p = .04). Thus, self-
report measures for individuals in the self-control induction condition were in keeping 
with expected self-reports of individuals who are high in baseline self-control. 
Induction effect on high versus low self-controllers 
We expected a likely ceiling effect in our induction. To determine whether the 
induction condition differentially affected high versus low self-controllers, we performed 
separate ANOVAs with our main independent self-report measures of self-control—the 
BIS-11 attention subscale, the BIS-11 attentional second-order subscale, and the BIS-11 
self-control subscale—as the dependent variables and induction condition and self-
control level as the independent variables. This time, we did see a significant interaction 
effect, in all three ANOVAs, as expected (i.e., we would not expect individuals already 
high on self-control to show post-induction changes, due to a ceiling effect.)  
For the BIS-11 attention subscale, while scores for high self-controllers remained 
unchanged from control to induction, for low self-controllers they fell significantly in the 
induction condition (F(1,107) = 3.69, p = .05), from an average score of 11.34 (SD = 2.9) 
to an average score of 9.11 (SD = 2.64). For the BIS-11 attentional second-order factor 
subscale, scores for high self-controllers once again remained unchanged, while for low 
self-controllers, they again fell significantly (F(1,107) = 4.70, p = .03), from an average 
of 18.24 (SD = 3.92) to an average of 15.1 (SD = 3.74). Finally, for the BIS-11 self-
control subscale, high self-controllers again exhibited no change, but low self-controllers 
in the induction condition scored lower, going from an average score of 13.6 (SD = 2.71) 
to one of 12.14 (SD = 2.99), a drop that indicates significantly higher levels of perceived 
self-control (F(1,107) = 4.92, p = .03) (see Figure 10). 
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Thus, as expected, we see the self-control induction working strongly in low self-
controllers, but having little effect on individuals already high in self-control. 
Risk-taking and performance on BIAS 
 To determine performance on the BIAS task, we performed an identical analysis 
to that used in Study 3 and Study 4. We coded optimal choices according to the optimal 
portfolio allocation strategy specified in Study 3, then took non-optimal choices and 
coded them as either risk-seeking or risk-averse by comparing them to the choice that a 
rational risk-neutral agent would make if he were updating his behavior according to 
Bayes’ Rule. We used the three resulting variables as dependent measures in three 
separate ANOVAs, with self-control and induction as the predictor variables. 
 We found a significant interaction effect for self-control and induction condition 
for the analysis of optimal choice behavior (F(1,105) = 4.21, p = .04). While in the 
control condition, individuals high in self-control significantly underperformed relative to 
those low in self-control, making significantly fewer optimal choices as expected, in the 
induction condition their behavior was nearly equalized: the self-control induction 
decreased performance for low self-controllers, as expected—but also improved 
performance for high self-controllers, much as was the case in the affect induction 
condition (see Figure 11). Thus, we replicated our findings from Study 4 on both counts. 
No other analyses were significant. 
Affect mediation 
To determine whether the observed changes were a result of affective 
mechanisms, we performed a mediation analysis using multiple mediation bootstrapping 
(Shrout & Bolger, 2002). We used the same aggregated PANAS anxiety and confidence 
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levels as in earlier studies and looked at optimal behavior as the dependent variable. 
Simultaneously adding the two factors decreased the effect of self-control from B = .238 
(p = .01) to B = .22 (p = .02), indicating significant (though admittedly slight) partial 
mediation (R2=.11; F(3,100) = 4.29; p = .01). As shown in Figure 12, higher self-control 
was associated with increased confidence (.15, p = .11), and increased confidence in turn 
led to a decrease in optimal choice (-.27, p = .02). While higher self-control was also 
associated with decreased anxiety (-.04, p = .28), the effect was marginal and non-
significant, as was the effect of anxiety level on optimal choice, suggesting that the 
positive affect boost is driving the small observed partial mediation.  
Affect mediation with pooled data, Studies 3-5 
Due to the affect-driven results observed in studies 3 through 5, we performed one 
final mediation analysis, using combined data from all three studies for increased power. 
We once again used multiple mediation bootstrapping (Shrout & Bolger, 2002), with 
BIAS choice as the dependent variable, self-control as the independent variable, and the 
composite PANAS measures of confidence and anxiety as the mediators. We found a 
significant partial mediation overall (R2 =.04; F(3,342) = 4.84, p = .003), with confidence 
as the main driver of the effect: its addition made the previously significant relationship 
between self-control and optimal choice (higher self-control leads to fewer optimal 
choices) non-significant – though its action was in the same direction as that original 
effect (self-control was significantly associated with increased confidence (2.15, p  = .03), 






 When we induced perceived self-control in low self-controllers, their performance 
on the BIAS plummeted: the number of optimal choices that they made in the task was 
significantly lower than that of low self-controllers in the control condition. In short, low 
self-controllers in the induction condition began to act in the same sub-optimal way that 
we have observed with high self-controllers in this environment. The induction, however, 
had the opposite effect on high self-controllers. While their perceived level of control 
didn’t change, they were made more aware of their perception of control, and adjusted 
their behavior accordingly: their performance became more optimal when self-control 
was made salient (i.e., the induction condition). 
In these findings, we replicated the results of the affect induction in Study 4. We 
further wanted to see whether the cause was similarly affective. In other words, did we 
observe these behavioral effects because manipulating self-control levels also increased 
feelings of confidence? A mediation analysis suggested that that was in fact the case.  
To confirm the strength of positive affect as the main driving factor, we then 
performed the same mediation for pooled data from Studies 3, 4, and 5. We found a 
significant partial mediation across all conditions in all three studies, confirming our 
hypothesis that the main driver of sub-optimal behavior in high self-controllers is an 
affective one: the greater confidence that comes from high self-control can lead to 
overconfidence and hence, impeded performance in uncertain and risky environments 
where the actual control that high self-controllers experience as a matter of course is 
limited. 
 




Summary of Results 
In a series of five studies, we examined the relationship between self-control, 
illusory control, and risky financial decision making. Our work was inspired by a 
conundrum presented by the stock market crash of 2007-2008—and by investor behavior 
more broadly: how could otherwise intelligent, successful people, with characteristics 
normally associated with better delay ability and sounder financial and numeracy-related 
judgments, make such irrational and seemingly out-of-character decisions as 
characterized the poor judgments that led to the crash, specifically, and to poor market 
decisions, more broadly? We hypothesized that the answer might lie in an underexplored 
aspect of high self-control: could something so generally positive have a paradoxical 
negative effect in certain risky, uncertain environments where the ability to exercise 
actual control is limited, such as the stock market? 
First (Study 1 and Study 2), we examined the performance of high versus low 
self-controllers on two tasks of risk-taking, the Columbia Card Task (CCT) and the 
Lottery Gambling Task (LGT). The tasks were chosen for two main reasons: they 
presented risky, uncertain environments, suggestive of that found in the stock market, and 
they necessitated opposite risk-taking patterns. Specifically, the CCT is a dynamic risk-
taking task, where it is optimal for a risk-neutral agent to take fewer risks, whereas the 
LGT is a static risk-taking task, where the optimal strategy for a risk-neutral agent is a 
risk-seeking one. We found that high self-controllers performed consistently worse on 
both tasks, both under stress and in normal conditions. They took too much risk on the 
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CCT and too little risk on the LGT, failing to learn from negative feedback and opening 
themselves up to errors of overconfidence.  
Our results suggested several things. First, the observed poor performance was 
not a direct result of a general risk-seeking or risk-averse propensity on the part of high 
self-controllers; had that been the case, we would have seen similar risk-taking patterns 
on both tasks—and necessarily, better performance on one of the two as a result. Instead, 
performance was universally poor. Second, there was a good chance that the sub-optimal 
choices were instead the result of a causal mechanism that stemmed from the illusion of 
control, and specifically, the positive affect and overconfidence that accompany it. In 
these initial studies, individuals high in self-control also scored higher on self-reported 
measures of illusory control—and showed an increased positive affect consistent with 
illusory control and overconfidence. What’s more, increased confidence and decreased 
anxiety were shown to be significant partial mediators of the non-optimal risk-taking 
patterns on the CCT. We thus had an initial hint that affect was serving as a major driving 
force of the surprisingly poor behavior in high self-controllers. However, our behavioral 
data remained purely correlational, and our measure of risk-taking, a ways removed from 
the type of risks that we’d normally associate with stock market behavior. 
We then proceeded to test the observed relationship between self-control, illusory 
control, and financial risk-taking directly, in an environment that was more germane to 
our main behavior of interest, risk-taking in the stock market. In studies 3, 4, and 5 the 
Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS) task replaced the CCT and LGT as 
our main measure of interest. In Study 3, we first validated our behavioral findings from 
Studies 1 and 2, showing that individuals high in self-control performed worse overall 
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than those low in self-control, making more errors in their choice of risk-taking strategy. 
We then looked at the effect of the study’s main induction, a classic illusion of control 
(IOC) manipulation that used a series of coin flips to induce feelings of being in control. 
We found that inducing IOC increased the number of errors committed by both high and 
low self-controllers. Individuals in the induction condition made fewer optimal choices 
than those in the control condition and performed worse as a result. Our results from this 
study both validated the possible downside of self-control (as high self-control 
individuals in the control condition significantly underperformed relative to low self-
control individuals) and confirmed causally what had previously been merely 
correlational: not only is illusory control tied to decreased performance, but actively 
inducing IOC leads to a decrease in performance. 
We then turned to the underlying mechanism of the IOC-self-control connection: 
why was it that the high self-controllers were underperforming? What was it, specifically, 
about the illusion of control that lead to an increase in risk-taking errors? In Study 4, we 
demonstrated that the main driver of the relationship was an affective one, namely, the 
increased confidence and positive affect associated with high self-control and 
confidence—or overconfidence, depending on the circumstances. When we induced 
positive affect in low self-controllers, we saw a significant reduction in the optimal 
choices they made on the BIAS. In other words, their decisions began to look remarkably 
like those of high self-controllers. We were initially surprised to see the opposite pattern 
in high self-controllers: the affect induction actually improved, instead of hurting, their 
performance. We explained this surprising result (which we replicated in Study 5) 
through a self-distancing mechanism, whereby the induction encourages increased self-
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awareness and self-reflection in high self-controllers, prompting them to monitor their 
behavior accordingly.  
Under normal circumstances, high self-controllers are not aware of their positive 
affect and the possible effects their baseline confidence may have on their susceptibility 
to overconfidence errors in stochastic environments where only limited control is 
possible. For them, the elements associated with high self-control—positivity, 
controllability, and the like—are a default base state, not something to be paid attention 
to. Usually, such a default is incredibly helpful and powerful, leading to better health, a 
better self-image, and better life outcomes (Shoda et al., 1990; Ayduk et al., 2000; 
Mischel et al., 2011). As such, there is no benefit in trying to control for it or take it into 
account when making decisions. When, however, there is an environment conducive to 
illusory control, the normal benefit is flipped: now, it would be useful to remove some of 
that positivity and confidence in order to realize that you are in an environment that is 
largely governed by chance. If you are to succeed in those conditions, you must learn 
quickly and carefully rather than unreflectively persevere in your initial decision strategy. 
But why would you do so all of a sudden, without any external prompting, if you’re not 
used to taking your baseline state into account—and that state is usually so beneficial? 
When we provide an opportunity for high self-controllers to reflect on their 
positive affect in the induction writing exercise, we do two things: first, we draw their 
attention to that affect, making it salient where in the past, it was simply a part of the 
background, and second, we provide a reflective pause prior to the start of the decision 
making task. In so doing, we accomplish what a simple IOC behavioral induction cannot: 
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make high self-controllers aware of their baseline state and thus enable them to 
compensate behaviorally in the subsequent task.  
We know from studies of affect and priming that the effect of a prime will 
disappear if one is made explicitly aware of the affect in question. In Schwarz and 
Clore’s (1983) study of weather and life satisfaction, the researchers found that people 
reported greater feelings of life satisfaction on sunny days than on rainy days. If, however, 
participants were first explicitly asked about the weather, the effect disappeared (see also 
Schwartz & Clore, 2003). Studies of psychological distance further demonstrate that 
distancing exercises that encourage a step away from the self, toward a more big-picture 
perspective, enhance wise reasoning and lead to behavioral improvements (Kross & 
Grossman, 2011) and that higher-level mental construals lead to higher self-control and 
decreases in delay discounting (Fujita, Trope, Lieberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Fujita & 
Carnevale, 2012). 
Our inductions in studies 4 and 5 inadvertently accomplished both of these goals. 
We drew high self-controllers’ attention to their high baseline positive affect and self-
image (Shoda et al., 1990; Ayduk et al, 2000; Mischel et al., 2011), and we provided 
them with a space for self-reflection prior to action, a kind of look-before-you-leap 
opportunity prompted by writing about the self. As high self-controllers are made more 
self-aware, the affect that normally works on a subconscious level becomes salient and 
begins to be taken into account in subsequent behavior in a way that it wouldn’t be 
otherwise. Thus, the high self-controllers are able to improve their behavior and bring it 
to the high levels that they are capable of achieving under normal circumstances. 
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That potential impact, however, is largely overshadowed in low self-controllers 
by the direct effects of the induction itself. We know from studies of self-control within a 
dual-system framework (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) that high self-controllers are more 
able to “cool” hot affective stimuli to begin with. They have better spontaneous self-
monitoring strategies (Mischel & Mischel, 1983) than low self-controllers and are 
generally more likely to improve those strategies over time, as metacognitive and self-
reflective knowledge increases with education and cognitive ability (Flavell, 1979), two 
areas where individuals with high delay ability excel (Mischel et al., 2011; Casey et al., 
2011; Moffitt et al., 2011). As such, individuals high in self-control are more likely to 
have the self-reflection that is necessary to learn more effectively and make better 
decisions to begin with (Keith & Frese, 2005; Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012).  
 Low self-controllers, on the other hand, lack two things: they do not have that 
overall self-reflective learning boost and they lack the baseline high positive affect that 
high self-controllers possess. As a result, they are both less likely to self-identify with the 
prime and to react in a self-reflective fashion to its reasonably subtle framing, taking it at 
face value rather than spontaneously pausing to assess themselves and their own behavior, 
as we’d expect high self-controllers to do. (Also note that, even if they do pause, they are 
less able to employ self-assessment strategies to begin with, and so will not likely have 
the time to reach the same conclusions and make the same behavioral adjustment as high 
self-controllers in such a short space.) So, the induction works as would be expected, and 
low self-controllers begin to resemble high self-controllers who have not had affect made 
salient and continue to act without compensating for its effects. 
  
76 
While on the one hand, it would seem like any distancing manipulation may 
accomplish the goal of cooling the “hot” behavior on the tasks of financial risk-taking, 
we believe that the content of the manipulation is just as important as the distance itself. 
In our control conditions for Study 4 and Study 5, we did not find the improved 
performance boost for high self-controllers. We can therefore conclude that it is not 
enough to be forced to perform some filler task or reflective exercise; there must be 
something in that task that stimulates the proper mindset and self-reflection. It could 
indeed be the case, however, that an explicit distancing instruction, such as a 
manipulation that would instruct participants to imagine themselves as flies on a wall 
observing their own behavior (Kross & Grossman, 2011) would be sufficient to improve 
behavior. Daniel Kahneman (2011) suggests that manipulations that boost the vigilance 
of System 2 (the “cool” system in the Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999 framework), such as 
distancing and vigilant mindset frames, should reduce overconfidence and lead to 
behavioral improvements.  Future studies will need to explicitly address the boundary 
conditions of effective inductions.  
Another possible consideration is that, whereas in the type of stochastic 
environment that we see in our studies, self-control goals may not be top of mind—that is, 
high self-controllers usually know precisely what the “right” answer is to any given 
situation, but in an uncertain, risky decision environment, there may not be an easily 
visible strategy—when we prime affect and self-control, we once again re-frame the 
environment in terms of classic self-control strategies, making the usual approach seem 
valid: we enable self-controllers to evaluate the task in self-relevant experiential terms, 
thus allowing them to employ strategies that have been successful in the past. We may 
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also be increasing construct accessibility in a way that again enables performance 
improvement. 
In Study 5, we manipulated perceived self-control and found that, like affect, it 
had a differential effect on high and low self-controllers. Low self-controllers in the self-
control induction made fewer optimal choices as compared to their control group 
counterparts, looking quite similar to high self-controllers at baseline in terms of their 
sub-optimal behavior. High self-controllers, on the other hand, exhibited an effect 
remarkably similar to that observed in Study 4: once again, they performed more, not less, 
optimally in the high induction condition—although their levels of reported self-control 
remained unchanged. This finding further validated our initial hypothesis, that drawing 
attention to the main causes of illusory control and overconfidence (positive affect, 
perceived control) provided high self-controllers with a self-awareness that in turn helped 
them “cool” their strategy in the BIAS task, so that it fell more in line with optimal 
behavior. 
Why, however, did the self-control induction work as it did for low self-
controllers? Was it a cognitive mechanism—or once again a more affective one? Because 
of our prior results, we suspected the latter. We performed an affect mediation and found 
that the presence of confidence was a significant partial mediator of the effects of self-
control on BIAS strategy use. We thus concluded that the main driver of our observed 
effects was an essentially affective one, a conclusion borne out by one final mediation 
analysis, where we pooled data from Study 3, Study 4, and Study 5 and found a 
significant partial mediation of the effects of self-control on BIAS performance: in all 




As a result of these studies, we can conclude several things. First, self-control has 
a definite dark side. The normally positive trait can make individuals more susceptible to 
overconfidence and illusory control biases in risky, uncertain environments where there is 
limited ability to exercise actual control. Luckily, such environments are rare. Unluckily, 
some of them—most notably, the stock market—have far-reaching effects that extend 
beyond the individual decision maker’s sub-optimal choices. 
Second, the main driver of this effect is an affective one. A major reason that high 
self-controllers are prone to overconfidence and illusory control is because of their higher 
overall positive affect and general confidence levels. Positive affect normally lends all 
matters of protective results to its bearers, from better health to increased longevity and 
life satisfaction—but it can also make them more susceptible to certain risky decision 
making biases that result in worse choices than would be the case in its absence. High 
self-controllers are generally higher in positive affect. Hence, they are specifically 
affected by this dynamic. 
Third, this pitfall of high self-control is relatively easy to address. Because high 
self-controllers are generally better at self-reflection and self-evaluation, they are able to 
adjust their behavior along more optimal lines if their attention is directed toward those 
elements that make them most susceptible to errors in judgment, namely, their positive 
affect and high perceived control. 
Thus, while it may be true that the type of person who succeeds on Wall Street in 
the short term is more similar to the law-of-the-jungle type of low self-controller that we 
stereotypically associate with the trading floor, as low self-controllers are more likely to 
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make optimal choices in such environments in the immediate term, it is equally true that 
over the long term, high self-controllers have ample opportunity for reflection—and have 
the ability to quickly correct for their biases in a way that low self-controllers do not. So, 
when positive affect or perceived control are naturally manipulated in the course of 
everyday trading and decision making (such as, for instance, making a sudden large profit 
or seeming to anticipate a stock or bond movement before it happens), low self-
controllers may find themselves falling prey to the same mistakes they had been 
protected from before—while high self-controllers may suddenly find themselves ever-
more aware of their own shortcomings, and ready to compensate accordingly. 
What’s more, they may be better at evaluation the environment to begin with: 
different environments lend themselves better to different types of learning. In our studies, 
we look at the immediate term, a circumscribed point in time where learning from 
immediate feedback leads to improvements in performance. In the real world, however, 
immediate behavioral adjustment is not always beneficial. Indeed, it may lead to 
overtrading and poor long-term financial decisions. It may be better in these 
circumstances to accumulate more information over a longer period of time—and only 
then to make behavioral adjustments. In this sense, once again, high self-controllers may 
have something of an edge: whereas they may perform worse at one point in time, over 
may instances, they are more likely to employ relevant self-reflective strategies that 
enable them to gain an overall advantage. 
Future directions 
Our results suggest that the connection between self-control and illusory control 
ought to be examined further, exploring the various domains and circumstances under 
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which this connection may be more or less strong, such as the presence of environmental 
uncertainty, and its impact on decision tasks, learning, and risk-taking.  
In future studies, we hope to accomplish several goals. First, we would like to 
explore the boundary conditions of the observed effects: in what circumstances are they 
most likely to manifest themselves, and where are they least likely to be visible? We 
would ideally use a number of different decision tasks to see where the effect holds—and 
where it breaks down—and what we can learn from each instance. We would also like to 
see whether primary reinforcement environments, such as shocks or food, would lead to 
similar patterns of behavior, or whether our findings are somehow specific to the 
financial domain. 
It is also important to include additional behavioral measures of self-control, such 
as, for instance, the Stroop Task, to see if we obtain the same results no matter the 
behavioral approach. What’s more, it would be useful to administer our behavioral 
measure of self-control at a different point in time from the dependent measures, so as to 
ensure that, first of all, there is no connection between measuring self-control in and of 
itself and the illusion of control, and second, that the measure itself isn’t serving as a self-
control prime. 
We would also like to re-introduce stress manipulations, to see what effect the 
ratcheting up of anxiety would have on the observed behaviors and relationships, 
especially when it comes to different financial decision tasks. An intriguing possibility 
would be to observe real traders in a natural setting over a period of several weeks, to be 
able to look at real instances of high stress and compare those to instances of relative 
calm. In laboratory and natural settings, we might also examine actual financial records 
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and spending histories over time as a function of the investors’ assessed degree of self-
control. 
We would also like to compare the behavior of traders and other financial 
professionals in their work environment, such as on the trading floor, and in other 
environments, to examine the effects of peer presence on behavior. It may be the case 
that the trading floor in itself changes self-control behavior, by introducing peer 
motivational goals and that as such, it serves as a hot trigger by eliminating self-control 
goals and in their stead, creating other goals, such as riskiness. It would be beneficial to 
measure baseline self-control levels in traders, specifically, and other financial 
professionals, more broadly, and to compare these levels to a general population: could it 
be the case that high self-controllers are discouraged from pursuing certain careers to 
begin with, because of the incongruity between their baseline state and the relevant 
environment? 
Future studies will also consider additional ways to counteract the susceptibility 
to illusory control, overconfidence, and resulting decision errors, such as instructing 
participants in better self-control strategies at the onset of the study and manipulating 
participants’ immediate goals. We would also like to focus explicitly on the mechanisms 
that we observed in Study 4 and Study 5: the self-reflection benefits that results from 
self-distancing and higher-level construal, as well as the behavioral de-biasing that comes 
from making implicit primes instead explicit opportunities for self-reflection. To do so, 
we would like to both introduce measures of metacognition and test alternative 
mechanisms, such as mindset and self-control frame, that may instead be responsible for 
the perceived performance boost. 
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In general, we hope to have the opportunity to explore the limits of self-control, 
the conditions under which it may prove costly, and the ways in which these conditions 
and the resulting sub-optimal behaviors can be mitigated, not just in the laboratory, but in 
real-world settings where they could have significant societal repercussions. Our hope is 
that this initial series of studies will invite further explorations of the possible darker side 
of self-control, opening a window for systematic research on the interaction of self-
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BIAS post-game self-assessment 
Please respond to the following, on a scale of 1-10. 
(1) How good to you think you are at predicting outcomes like these? (0 = very bad; 5 = 
average; 10 = pretty good); * 
(2) How well do you think you would do on the task if you were distracted? (0 = much 
worse; 10 = much better); and  
(3) How much do you think you would improve with practice? (0 = not at all; 5 = some 
improvement; 10 = a good deal).* 
 
On a scale of 1-5, 1 being don't agree at all and 5 being very much agree, please respond 
to the following: 
  1. During the game, I took risks. 
  2. During the game, I followed a safe strategy. 
  3. During the game, I felt in control.* 
  4. I was able to figure out the best strategy to use in the game.* 
  5. I followed the best strategy for this game.* 
  6. In this game, it is financially rewarding to take risks. 
  7. In this game, it is financially rewarding to play it safe. 
  8. I felt in control during the game.* 
  9. I felt I performed well overall.* 
  10. I felt I performed better than others did.* 
  11. I felt I could have performed better if I had more time. 
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  12. I thought the game was stressful. 




Positive affect induction 
 
"In the space below, please write a short paragraph (3-5 sentences or so)  that describes a 
time when you made a lot of money by making a  positive investment. The investment 
can be in the stock market or elsewhere."  
 
Positive affect control 
 
"In the space below, please write a short paragraph (3-5 sentences or so) that describes a 




Below, please list 4 (four) separate occasions when you exercised self-control: you didn't 
do something you really wanted to do. You do not need to use complete sentences. Please 
number your list. 
 
Self-control control  
 
Below, please list 4 (four) separate occasions when you changed your mind about a 






To capture the multi-level nature of the BIAS task, we used a generalized 
hierarchical (i.e., mixed effects) linear model, fit with REML, to supplement our analysis.  
We used commission errors, our measure of self control, as the independent variable. For 
the dependent measure, we used two measures. First, we created a dichotomous variable 
(0,1) for optimal choices. Then, we created a second dichotomous variable to code for 
risk-averse (1) or risk-seeking (0) choices. We used block and subject as random effects, 
to capture the repeated measure nature of our dependent variable and correlations within 
block and subject induced by a nested classification structure. For the individual-level 
model, we used a logit model specification. To perform the analysis, we used the LME4 
package within R. 
We ran a model to test for the effects of several covariates of interest—age, 
gender, income, and education. As none had any significant effect, we dropped them 
from all further analyses. 
The studies are listed in order, and following the three studies, we show analyses 
for the pooled data for Study 3, Study 4, and Study 5 combined. For space considerations, 







Risk averse/seeking errors 
Baseline22 
Models: 
fit.glmmC0: ra ~ 1 + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmmC01: ra ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmC0 4 7825.1 7852.9 -3908.6    
fit.glmmC01 5 7820.2 7854.8 -3905.1 6.97 1 0.008** 
 
Baseline versus induction23 
Models: 
fit.glmmC01: ra ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmmC11: ra ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + coin_trial_type + (1 | serial) +  
fit.glmmC11:     (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmC01 5 7820.2 7854.8 -3905.    





                                                
22 “Baseline” will always refer to the base condition: does self-control have an effect on the DV of interest? 
23 “Baseline versus induction” will always refer to the effect of the induction condition 
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Summary of model with baseline, induction 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.0578644 0.240550 
Block (Intercept) 0.0045502 0.067455 
Residual  0.1557443 0.394644 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.68186 0.04346    15.69 
Self-control -0.13990     0.04572    -3.06 
IOC induction 0.09388     0.04581     2.05 










Baseline versus induction 
Models: 
fit.glmmAF0: opc ~ commission_errors + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmmAF1: opc ~ commission_errors + affcon + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmAF0 5 12590 12626  -6290.0    
fit.glmmAF1 6 12588  12631  -6288.2  3.553  1  0.05*  
 
Summary of model with baseline, induction 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.01220262  0.110465 
Block (Intercept) 0.00072775  0.026977 
Residual  0.22029842  0.469360 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.323951    0.027088   11.959 
Self-control 0.001583    0.001234    1.283 




Risk averse/seeking errors 
Baseline versus induction 
Models: 
fit.glmmAF0: ra ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmmAF1: ra ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + affcon + (1 | serial) + (1 |  
fit.glmmAF1:     block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmAF0 5 6056.8   6090.2  -3023.4    
fit.glmmAF1 6 6053.0  6093.1  -3020.5  5.7622       1 0.016* 
 
Summary of model with baseline, induction 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.07957735  0.282095 
Block (Intercept) 0.00098638  0.031407 
Residual  0.16131496  0.401640 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.577512 0.098471 5.865 
Self-control -0.045294 0.059072  -0.767 





Risk averse/seeking errors, affect mediation 
Models: 
fit.glmmAF1: opc ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + affcon + (1 | serial) + (1 |  
fit.glmmAF1:     block) 
fit.glmmAF4: opc ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + affcon + 
as.numeric(PANAS_positive_total) +  
fit.glmmAF4:     (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmAF1 6 12590  12633  -6289.0    
fit.glmmAF4 7 12587  12637  -6286.5  4.9066  1 0.02675 * 
 
Summary of model with affect mediation 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.01186328  0.108919 
Block (Intercept) 0.00072787   0.026979 









 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.426044   0.043677 9.754 
Self-control 0.001796   0.024199    0.074 
Affect induction 0.034215    0.024490   1.397 










fit.glmmSC00: opc ~ 1 + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmmSC0: opc ~ commission_errors + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmSC00 4 13308  13337  -6650.2    
fit.glmmSC0 5 13304 13340  -6646.9  6.736       1 0.009** 
 
Baseline and interaction 
Models: 
fit.glmmSC2: opc ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + sccon + (1 | serial) + (1 |  
fit.glmmSC2:     block) 
fit.glmmSC3: opc ~ I(commission_errors.x > 14) + sccon + I(I(commission_errors.x >  
fit.glmmSC3:     14) * sccon) + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmSC2 6 13683  13727  -6835.7    







Summary of model with baseline, induction, interaction 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.00712180  0.084391 
Block (Intercept) 0.00045947  0.021435 
Residual  0.22295975 0.472186 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.31795 0.02036 15.619 
Baseline self-control 0.07871     0.02793   2.819 
Self-control induction 0.05767     0.02648    2.178 
Baseline self-
control*induction 
-0.08941 0.03831   -2.334 
 
Risk averse/seeking errors 
Baseline  
Models: 
glmm.ras00: ra ~ 1 + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 




Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmSC00 4 20503  20534  -10247    
fit.glmmSC0 5 20501  20540 -10245  3.7746  1  0.05* 
 
Summary of model 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.0734832  0.271078 
Block (Intercept) 0.0033059  0.057497 
Residual  0.1562684 0.395308 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.667848    0.033457   19.961 











fit.glmm0: opc ~ 1 + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmm1: opc ~ commission_errors + (1 | serial) + (1 | block)  
 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmm0 4 41196  41230 -20594    
fit.glmm1 5 41191  41233 -20591  6.9223       1 0.009** 
 
Summary of model with affect mediation 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.00842906  0.091810 
Block (Intercept) 0.00023108  0.015201 
Residual  0.22069556  0.469782 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.3344093   0.0114461    29.22 





Optimal decisions, affect mediation 
Models: 
fit.glmmPC0: opc ~ commission_errors + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
fit.glmmPC1: opc ~ commission_errors + as.numeric(pod[, 24]) + as.numeric(pod[,  
fit.glmmPC1:     25]) + (1 | serial) + (1 | block) 
Model Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df PR(>Chisq) 
fit.glmmAF1 5 41191 41233  -20591                              
fit.glmmAF4 7 41188  41247  -20587  6.8142  2  0.033*  
 
Summary of model with affect mediation 
Random effects 
Groups Name Variance SD 
Serial (Intercept) 0.00875833  0.093586 
Block (Intercept) 0.00022288  0.014929 
Residual  0.22041312  0.469482 
 
Fixed effects 
 Estimate SE t-value 
(Intercept) 0.3650201   0.0263805   13.837 
Self-control 0.0013676   0.0005882    2.325 
Confidence mediation -0.0016091 0.0006235  -2.581 









Figure 1. Self-reports of (a) response strategies and (b) emotional states (PANAS) as a 
function of self-control level, indicative of illusory control by high self-controllers. All 
differences shown are significant at the .05 level. The top panels indicate results from 
Study 1, and the bottom, from Study 2. Error bars represent the standard error of the 







Figure 2. Risk-taking in the Lottery Gambling Task (LGT) as a function of self-control 






Figure 3. Responses in the Columbia Card Task (CCT) as a function of self-control level 
and stress condition: (a) Risk-taking, i.e., average number of cards taken over the 24 trials, 







Figure 4. Mediation analysis for CCT. Regression coefficients are shown adjacent to the 
arrows. The coefficient labeled “after” indicates the results for the relation between 



















































































Figure 5. Structure of the Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy trials. First, 
participants see the three assets. Then, the word “CHOOSE” appears. After they make 
their choice, they see the Outcome screen, which tells them earning for the current trial 
(“current”) and for all trials leading up to the present one (“total”). Then, they are shown 






Figure 6. Amount bet on the coin flip as a function of self-control and induction 
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Figure 9. Number of risk-seeking errors in BIAS task, as a function of self-control and 
affect induction. 
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Self-control induction effects 
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Figure 11. Number of optimal choices in BIAS task, as a function of baseline self-control 
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Figure 12. Affect mediation analysis for optimal choices on the BIAS task in Study 5. 
Regression coefficients are shown adjacent to the arrows. The coefficient labeled “after” 
indicates the results for the relation between condition and risk-taking after the mediators, 











-.24 (p = .01) 
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Figure 13. Affect mediation analysis for optimal choices on the BIAS task for pooled 
data, Study 3, 4, and 5. Regression coefficients are shown adjacent to the arrows. The 
coefficient labeled “after” indicates the results for the relation between condition and 











-.13 (p = .04) 
After: .11 (p = .08) .02 (p = .33) 
